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I IntrodUo tion 
If we may judge by the Price control section ot the 
elaborate code of Hammurabi 1 ancient King of Babylon, 2100 
B.C., it would seem apparent that prices have been vary impor. 
tant to mankind for thousands of years. While the effective-
ness of that attempt at price control is not known, we do know 
that since that time a great deal of economic theory has been 
developed about prices and price control. This has appeared 
in countless books and bJI'oohures and has been discussed and 
debated no end by countless individuals, orators, economists, 
politicians, and political agenoiea. 
Without fail 1 .inflationary impact of war upon indi· 
viduals and governmental bodies revives popular interest in 
and demands tor price controls. By such controls it is claim-
ed that rising price levela are restrained, excessively infla-
ted governmental indebtedness due to war is minimized, and 
severe disparity 1n prices is avoided at the conclusion of the 
period of emergency. 
In more recent years, subsidies of many varieties 
have been used to control prices and to stimulate production 
with varied success in mafl7 sag11111nta of the economy and in 
many countries. Tho •cold war" of today calling for greatly 
increased production of war materials, one of the moat im-
portant of which is copper, revives our interest 1n the 
economic aspects of price control and subsidies. Historical 
data available about previous private and government attempts. 
at price control or copper abould indicate the ettective-
neaa ot these attempts as well aa those features to be 
improved upon, those to be discarded, and clues to new 
approaches. 
The purpoae here ia to examine the application and 
effectiveness or premium pa,..nta upon the domestic produc-
tion ot copper as provided tor in the two Price Control Acta 
designated, to note any weakneaaes or the Acta in practice, 
and to suggest modifications which might be or benefit to 
future consideration or Acta with similar objectives. 
There is no evidence or work done by others on 
this aubject. There is a history or the Premium Price Plan 
compiled by Ho E. Olund and s. Ao Gustavson ot the Bureau of 
Mines ot the United States Department of the Interior. This 
ia primarily a detailed record and lenvea much to be obtained 
from within and without sovernment sources in order to present 
the complete picture or these Acta and their impact upon our 
econoM7• 
The plan is to approach this problem b7 examination 
ot, as they have affected copper, (1) Price control attempts 
ot History by private individuals or organizations, (2) Price 
Control of Copper World War I, 1917-181 (3) Pre-World War II 
Mobilization and Price Control Plana, (4) The Premium Price 
Plan (1942-47) and the Defense Production Act ot l950o 
II Historical Background of Copper 
A. ll! Diacoverz ~ B~l7 Development 
Prom the remote period of its first use to the 
very present, copper has played a vital role in the history 
ot the human race in peace and in war. Although this paper 
concerns the role ot copper during a period of war, and now 
ot preparation tor war, it may well be concerned in the be-
ginning with the story of copper during tts centuries of 
peacetime development as well. 
Copper haa many virtues as a metal in that it i1 
a brilliant metal, takes a beautiful polish, is in a high 
de81'ee malleable and ductile and in tenacity falls short 
only ot iron. Apart from gold and silver, early u1ed tor 
ornamental purposes, copper was probably the first metal to 
be utilized by mankind. Being malleable when found in ita 
pure state, ita first users found that it required no metal-
lurgical treatment. Ample evidence is discovered from time 
to time, aa prehistoric copper location workings are revealed, 
that the more readily reducible oxide ores were also treated 
by primitive peoples. The extraction of metal from sulphide 
ores presented more difficulty and, in some districts, so 
completely resisted satisfactory treatment that they were 
neglected•* 
Copper is widely distributed occurring in most 
soils, ferruginous mineral waters and ores. It has been die-
* 21, p~ 401-410 
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eovared in saawaed1 in straw, hay, meat, eggs and cheese, 
apparently placed there by natura as an important element of 
food tor animals and man. 
1. Earlx Hiatorz 
Historians conclude that about 10,000 yeara ago, 
8 
a date not remote as measured by the lite of humanity, soma 
Neolithic man selected a chunk of reddish rook trom a crevice 
in the earth and round that the strange material made a battle 
mallet that was tar superior to the staves of his adversaries.* 
Centuries of use of copper in weapons and crude utensils fol-
lowed before bronae came into use before 3500 B.c., while 
brass did not come into use until shortly before the Christian 
Era. so extensively was it used that centuries of time are 
classified as belonging to the Bronae Age. 
2. !!!!£ But !{iatory 
Possibly it was in Mesopotamia that man first found 
copper. Definitely it was used early in Egypt, for it is well 
established that after the Egyptian Stone Age or great skill, 
copper began to be used. The main part of Africa is the only 
great world area in which an age of using copper or bronze 1s 
not recorded, In Asia, Europe and the two Americas, abundant 
evidences of its use are 1bund. But the richest or archaeolo-
gical discoveries have been in Eastern Asia Minor, Western 
Europe, and Northern Africa bordering on the Mediterranean. 
According to Pliny, the Elder, the Roman supply 
• 1 t P• "I 
oame chiefly from Cyprus, eo it came to be known as "aea 
cypr1um", which waa gradually shortened to cypr1um and then 
corrupted to cuprum, from which comes the F..ngliah wcra copper. 
3. North American H1atorz 
In North America, the Great Ice Age of several 
hundred thousand years ago set the location tor the first 
copper mining. This ice sheet grinding down from the North, 
tore many maases of copper from the place in which they had 
been deposited by geologic processes and dragged them south-
ward. The glacier transported close to the eventual places 
of their use, s large part of the deposit of native copper 
which for decades furnished a large part of the world's 
supply. These were the famous Lake Superior deposits first 
used by the North American Indiana. 
Historians say that an Indian, probably searching 
for a atone auitable tor an arrowhead, tried one of these nug-
gets, liked it, and looked for more. In this hunt tor more, 
it doubtless developed that the metal was also fOund in cre-
viaee of rocks. The Lake SUperior area consequently became 
the location of the greatest industrial achievement of the 
North American Indian who used copper tor fish hooks, knives 
end crude utensils. Until very recent times, the mining pits 
excavated by the Indians, as well as tens of thousands of 
atone boulder sledges used by them as mining tools, were to 
be found in parts ot that territory as memorials to the ab-
original industry or the day. some large chunks or metal 
9 
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were unearthed and moved some distance trom the mining pita, 
only to be abandoned. one ot the largest ot these waa a :rour-
ton ma.ee moved two miles trOll. the outol'opping lode before 
abandonment•• 
4. Oopper Ores and :metr 'l'l'ea1llaeDt 
~he principal orea ot copper are the oxides, the 
oarboDetea, the ohlol'1dea, ~e silicates and the sulphides. 
The aulpbur compoUnds o:r copper are the moat valuable trom 
the eoonomio point ot Tin. Some ot thes.e groups contain 
about 80 per cent copper, others about 35 per oent, but maD7 
ot the group worked by wet prooeaaea ooDtaiD leas tban 5 per 
cent eopper. Until the Middle Agea, the development of the 
e~raet1ve prooeaaes waa vary gradual and was oon:t'ined mainly 
to obtaining greater recovery or metal :rrom a given quantity 
ot ore. By that time, however, the general prinoiplea Under-
lying the methods ot dl'7 exbacUon were in uae. S1noa all 
aulpburated oopper ores are invariably contaminated with 
araen1c and antimony, it is neoeaaary to eliminate these im-
pur1t1ea at the earliest poaa1ble stages o:t' the treatment. 
fhla ia etteoted by oaloination or roasting. The roasted 
Ol'ea are then smelted to a mixture ot copper and iron aul-
ph1dea known aa ooarae metal. This ia then smelted twice 
more to obtain "bl1ater oopper" containing 95-97 per cent o:r 
the metlal.** 
. * l, ~. 23 
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t;. . EaJ'ly R.etin1Jlg teobl!i!!!el 
"Blister oopper" st111 contains many impuri_t1ea 
auoh ae aulphUP, iron, lead, some araenic, antimony, a1nc, 
nickel, cobalt, and, in some caaes, a1lver and gold in sut-
fioient quantities to pay tor their extraotion. The object 
ot refining 1s to remove the impurities as tar as possible 
and to oast the oopper into cake or bar form suitable tor 
mechanical treatment or conversion into rods, sheets, tubea 
eto. The elimination of impurities is accomplished by oxi-
dation or by vol1t111sation. DUring this prooess, the molten 
metal beoomes partly oxidiaed, and to convert oxides back 
into valuable metal, "poling" was an early process. "Poling" 
consisted ot forcing gr .. n trees or logs under the surface 
of the molten 1118tlll and by their combustion and dist1llat1on 
to reduoe the oxide to metal. Th1a waa a somewhat delicate 
operation and required great akill or else re-doing. 'l'hese 
early refining processes were quite dependent tor quality of 
metal produced upon a variety of factors such as turnaoe oon• 
ditiona, temperature, technical shortcomings due to lack of 
experience, and the necessity of mixing ores from a variety 
ot so111"caa • Each ore with 1 ta own impurities contributed to 
a great variety ot 1sptU'1t1ea which greatly complicated these 
early refining methode.• 
6. Development.£! Modern Techniques 
The rapidly 1noreaa1ng use of copper 1n the last 
* 2lt P• 408 
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halt ot the 19th Century haatened the development of the 
eaormoua Amertoan ore bo41ea. Theae were of comparatively 
unifoPM oompoaition and permitted an immenaely greater aoale 
ot operation. Under theae intlueneea, refining proceaaea 
leaped torwud •. Treatment uthoda were continually being 
modified to take fUll advantage of all .modern metallurgical 
improvements, the moat important ot whioh has been aimplit1• 
oation ot the elrtraot1ve prooeuea. In principle, theae 
operations were similar to thoae already deaoribed and may 
be olau1t1e4 under three ~1n headlng11 (l) conoentration, 
(2) turnaoe treatment, and (3) eleotrolytio refining. Other 
minor operationa involve hydro•metallurgioal extraction teoh-
niquea or leaohing. 
B Uneteenth Century PI'Och\OUon .!.!1!! Pr1oing Problema 
18 
Inaa1111oh aa copper ia found in moat aeotiona of the 
world and haa been inoreaaingly used by all raoea, ita price 
has been aubjeat to world intluenoea of aupply and demand, of 
peaoe and war, and of numeroua attempts to control pr1oea for. 
profit. Changing quantities ot supply and changing aourcea 
ot aupply which ooourred during the 19th Century with their 
resulting etfeot upon the price of copper, provide en impor-
tant h1ator1cal baoksround and pattern tor our approach in 
thia theaia. 
1. Domination!!. Prloe Througl1 Channels ,2! Trade 
England waa the early oenter of copper amelting 1n 
the 19th Oentur,-. The methode ot the Auooia·ted Smelters ot 
Swansea, a poup which waa aotive all during thia oentury, 
had definite bearing upon chansea in the channels ot trade 
in copper. Thia aaaooiation waa designed tor the main par-
pose of keeping prices ot copper ore and regulus low and 
the selling price ot oopper high. This was a very .favorable 
period tor ita operations aa there waa an a.bundanoe ot ore 
to be had cheap and an inoreaaing demand tor the metal in 
the engineering trade. 
~he •moctua operandi" ot the association, partieu-
larly from 1851-1860, waa tor each amelter or ita g.Poup to 
bid tor the ore it required at ita own price while 1t had 
been largely agreed what would be paid tor each elaaa ot ora 
and regulua. At that tiu, Chile waa the moat important 
aingle produeer a.nd her oopper waa .carried in sa111ng ahipa 
wh1oh, being dependent upon the w1nda, would tend to arrive 
in port the a.-a day. The smelters, watching these collec-
tive arr1vala, ao regulated ore prioaa aa to aeoura hnge 
profits subsequently on the smelted copper•* 
The Chilean mine ownera naturally sought a remedy 
by instituting smelting operations at the minas in about 1853. 
The remedy waa affective in widening the market tor the re-
fined Chilean produota and enabled Continental oonaumera to 
buy direct instead of troa English smelters under auoh arbi-
trary conditione. 
2o Domination .!!, Price 'l'hzoousl! 11Bj' Product" Production 
Production of copper was inoreaaad in thia earl7 
* I, P• 7 
period ea a by-product ot an error in buainess judgment on 
the part ot a French innat!Mintl houae. J:n 18/SB this group 
perauaded the King ot Sicily to grant them a monopoly ot 
the export ot Sicilian aulpbar. The conaequenoe ot thia 
monopoly waa an increase in the price of sulpbnr from 5 
En!liah pounds " ton to 14 English pounds. .~.a 11. result ot 
thia increase, pyrites ot England, Ireland, and later of 
Spain end Portugal became new important sources ot sulphur. 
The pyrites ot Spain and Portugal were cupreoua pyritea and 
the copper extracted from them by e new wet proceaa, became 
substantial. In the decade of 1841-1850 SPAin and Portugal 
produced 3850 tone ot copper and in 1881-90, 4821900 tons. 
3. DondnaUon!!, Price 'fh.ro!!h ShUt !!! source !?.! Production 
It wu during this period that production began 1n 
the Un11;,ed stetea. In 1845 the u. s. yield na 100 tone. 
In the decade or lBSl-90 thia country produced 730,700 tone 
and had become the producer ot one-third of the world's 
supply. There were two short periods trom 1871·1873 and 
1879-1880 when the United States imported copper from England. 
Thereafter ahe became a large exporter and these exports, to• 
gether with Spanish copper trom the pyrites mines mentioned, 
more than compensated ~or decreasing shipments from Chile and 
elsewhere. Up to 1880 the market prioe was generally depead• 
ent upon the supply ~rom Chile. Light or heavy arrivals ot 
Chilean copper and/or tluotuationa in warehouse atooks led 
the .. rket prioe movements. Wben, however, in 18821 Amerioa 
came into the market as a permanent producer, these general 
conditions began to alter. Experts sent from England to 
gauge the possibilities of American production revealed to 
the world the probable permanence, stability and expansion 
of production which might be expected from the United States. 
4. Atte~pted Domination g£ Price Through Restriction 
~ .:,P.::.r.;::O.;::d:.:U:.::C~t;.::i;.::O;:.::n 
In spite of the potential increDse of supply from 
the Un1ted States, a fact well known throughout the world, 
another price control attempt was made. Since the trade had 
not been too profitable for a number of years, M. Secretan 
~ 
ot the Societe des Metaux de Paris, although tully cognizant 
15 
of changing production conditions and partly responsible for 
bearing down prices in the past, conceived the idea of con-
trolling the copper markets of the world by obtaining the out-
put of the leadillg producers •. Backed by all110st limitless 
financial support of the Comptoir d'Escompte, the second most 
powerful banking establishment in France, he offered to buy 
for three years the entire output of the v~rld's leading pro-
ducers on very favorable terms. By mid 1888, thirty-seven 
companies including all the 1mportant minoa of the world were 
bound by agreements with his syndicate, and about 80-85 per 
cent of the world copper production wee covered•* 
The agreements involved restriction of production 
b7 mines involved. M. secretan felt that the general trade 
* :s, P• 79 
revival then setting in would increase prices neturally and 
that restriction would boost them artificially but that con-
sumption would not be oheoked by a moderate increa.se in pr1oe. 
The plan dld not develop as expected. Del!\lera 1n 
copper who did not feel his premises sound sold for forward 
delivery •. · Price increases were not moderate; scrap meta.l was 
attracted to the market; copper stocks from all over the 
world were se~t to the JDropean market; s~ll producers who 
were not included in agreements stepped up productionJ and 
actual consumers in the United States e.nd Europe bought YUY 
sparingly. The f'irst evidence• of real dif.fic'lll.ty were ap.. 
parent in 1889 when the syndicate attempted to extend the 
agreell18nts for from 6 to 12 years. This was not acceptable 
to producers. Shortly after, the bubble burst end in one 
day copper prices tell from 75 to 35 pounds sterling per ton. 
5. Attempted Dom1ne.t1on of Price Throuf?h Control 21. Major 
SupplY Sourcep 
The next 19th Century attempt at price control 
was made in the United statea aince at the time, copper pro-
duction of this country was more than half or the world'• 
production. 'l'he J\malgamated Copper company was foPmed 1n 
1899 by Thomas Lawson, William Rookefeller and Henry Rogera 
at a time when important domeatic mining companies were tall• 
ing under the influenoe of Standard Oil Company 1ntereata. 
Although their plana to oontrol Lake Superior oompaniea were 
DOt aa auooeaatul aa ant1o1pated• A~~algameted did obtain 
11 
control of the great bulk of United states production. B7 
auch control, it expected to dominate world prices. soon 
after ita formation but before it could exert much influence,· 
an important price adYanoe was registered 1n the London 1181"• 
ket. Even though financial critics foretold disaster tor 
this attempt and, in the early months or 19001 European con-
sumption waa tor a time decidedly curtailed, the continually 
increasing consumption of the world absorbed production at 
the higher prices. For a while it looked as though the A-.1-
gamated Company had little to do with world prices, although 
markets fluctuated heavily under apeoulative 1ntluencaa. To• 
wards the end of 1901, EUrope~ consumption was decidedly 
reduced ~d supplies began to pile up on Amalgamated, whieh 
perceived the trend and ualo•ded large tonnages in the LOndon 
market regardless of price, bringing financial disaster to 
many traders on both aidee of the AtlantiC•* 
In thia lllaftner, eded the laat of all the unauoce ... 
tul attempts to control world copper prices in the 19th Century. 
6. Landmarks 2! !!!! Nineteenth Oectur;r 
The 19th Century saw changing sources of aupply, 
greatly increased supplies, rap1dl7 growing oonaumption, and 
a downward pr1oe trend. New teabniquea for metal extraction, 
high prioea, increasing demands, and attempted prodnotion and 
priGe controls oaused the reQpeni.ng ot minea worked extenaivel7 
in anoient timea, the working of some mines for the whole oen• 
tury, and the opening of new minoa in the Western Hemis-
phere,# Oonauap111on during the oentury was juat about equal 
to the produotion ot 101 0001000 tona ot whioh 3 1000 1000 were 
produeed in the last decade. Toward the end ot the 19th Cen• 
tury, one could eee deyeloplng the oYerwhelming product1Ye 
oapacity of the United States and also ita hugo appetite tor 
the matal.#l 
DQring part of this century, which ooYers ao many 
important phaaoa of copper production, consumption and price 
control attempta, we are presented with a complete reoord of 
the rise, maturity, and deol1ne ot the t1rat major copper 
prOductns area of the United stat••• Spread before ua ia a 
record of development and exploitation, of technology, of 
labor, of investment and repatriation of capital, and ot tho 
ul1l1111ate nolution of ... sinal properties requiring high 
prioea or aubsidioa to stay 1n operation. Here, with the 
paaaase of time, we aee one of the richest properties the 
world haa enr known beoou a IIIU'ginal prOducer • and the 
first area to reoeive subsidies before and under the Emer-
gency Prioe Control Act of 19ta. Thia ia the Michigan Lake 
SUperior area. Since moat do .. atio mining properties in 
other areas, whieh beoame marginal during this period, wore 
senerally affected by the aame taotora and operated under 
111110h the aa.ma condi tiona a a did the Michigan minoa, we pre• 
sent the history of th1a area as a background tor our approach 
# !able I, P• 19 
"# Table II, P• 20-21 
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'l'ABLK 1 
Pl"oduot1on ot Cop~l' 1n the Nineteenth Centu.ry 
(in toaa) 
1. Ano1ent Mines or Groupe WO:rked 'l'hroughout the 19th Oen\ul':r 
conUJIIlOUal:r troll 1801-1900 
'D'ni ted Klagdo• 
Gel'lllan7 
Swedea 
JIOI'Wil7 
Rllaaia (Eat) 
'l'otal 
864,660 
4'72,520 
2. Ancient Minea WOrked Xxtllla1Te17 1n Jlnoient '1'111l8a IUII1 Re• 
opened during the l"h Centu:l'7 
Spain & Portugal 
Japan 
Other 
'l'otal. 
3. Minea Which On1:r started working Dnl'ing the 19th centur:r 
Oh11e1 Bolhia, P81'U 
Kextoo, Venesuela, Cuba 
Other a 
1,9'74,750 
396,090 
133,.357 
2,993,540 
1'78 836 
u.s.A. 
Atria a 
Australia 
'l'otal 
4. In Hunt's 11Br1t1ah M1ntna" the following table 11 ginn u 
the result ot an 1nveat1gat1on ot lllinea in the Red:l'uth D1a-
tl'1ot tor a periOd ot thirt:r :reua. 
35 lllinea 
.f:O II 
31 II 
11-1 II 
luted 
• 
II 
II lea a 
20 yeara 
10 yeara 
5 years 
thu 5 yeara 
Source - A Century ot Copper, P• 6 
lt 
TABLE II 
World, u. S., and Michigan Output or New Copper 
(thousands or pounds) 
"' 
,, 
Mich.or 
Year u. s. 
Subtotal World u. s. Mich. 
1845-1866 3,489,940 202,264 150,758 74.5 
1867 a 22,400 17.526 78.2 
1868 a 25,984 20,935 80.6 
1869 a 28,000 26,625 95.1 
1870 a 28,224 24,622 87.2 
1871 284,748 29,120 26,748 91.9 
1872 a 28,000 24,553 87.7 
1873 a 34,720 30,090 86.7 
1874 a 39,200 34,332 87.6 
1875 a 40,320 36,039 89.4 
1876 a 42,560 38,370 90.2 
1877 a 47,040 39,025 83.0 
1878 a 48,160 39. 691 82.4 
1879 337,924 51,520 42,849 83.2 
1880 346,696 60,480 49,737 82.2 
1881 362,686 71,680 53, 573 74.7 
1882 404,074 90,646 56,983 62.9 
1883 448,614 115,526 59,702 51.7 
1884 490,010 144,947 69,353 47.8 
Subtotal· 
1867-1884 5, 587,460 948,527 690,753 72.8 
1885 506,242 1€ 5,876 72,148 43.5 
1886 482,176 156,735 79,891 51.0 . 
1887 501,076 180,921 75,421 41.7 
1888 589,608 226,361 86,472 38.2 
lf'89 582,036 226,776 88,176 38.9 
1890 610,668 259,763 101,410 39.0 
1891 633,344 284,122 114,223 40.2 
1892 704,500 344,999 123,198 . 35.7 
1893 669,856 329,354 112,605 34.2 
1894 706,986 354,188 114,309 32.3 
1895 737,926 380,613 129,331 34.0 
1896 846,676 460,061 143,524 31.2 
1897 909,062 494,078 145,282 29.4 
1898 961,808 626,513 158,492 30.1 
1899 1,038,672 568,667 147,400 26.9 
1900 1,090,878 606,117 145,461 24.0 
1901 1,160,018 602,073 166,289 26.0 
1902 1,228,872 669,509 170,609 25.9 
1903 1,312,960 698,045 192,401 27.6 
1904 1,454,432 812,537 208,309 25.6 
Subtotal 
1885-1904 16,726,796 8,337,308 2, 565,002 30.8 
1905 1,570,802 888,784 230,288 26.9 
1906 1, 696,654 916,971 230,526 25.1 
·1907 1, 689,410 847' 151 216,007 26.5 
1908 1,640,200 956,841 223,540 23.4 
1909 1,824,476 1,126,521 233. 616 20.7 
1910 1,922,636 1,088,237 221,163 20.3 
1911 1,993,014 1,114, 764 219.771 19.7 
1912 2,205,012 1,249,095 216,793 17.4 
TABLE II 
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World, u. s., and Miohir:an Output of New Co~:'f":r (cont'd) 
(thousands of pounds) 
Mich .of 
Year World u. s. Mich. lJ. s. 
1913 2,181,254 1,235,670 139,€[)0 11.3 
1914 2,05',,090 1,148,431 166,184 14.5 
19lb 2,330,886 1,488,072 2b8,103 17.3 
1916 2,998,1:'80 2,005,875 266,839 13.3 
1917 3,149,186 1,R95,434 2b6,037 l3.f' 
1918 3,158, 592 1,910,023 228,174 ll.9 
~btotal 
1905-1918 30,213,792 17,871,769 3,106, 690 17.4 
1919 2,191,372 1,212,334 178,366 14.7 
1920 2, 114,328 1,?24, 550 161,344 13.2 
1921 1,229,266 466,191 92,262 19.8 
1922 1,904, 774 964,584 121,387 12.6 
1923 2,682,998 1,477,740 137,957 9.3 
1924 2,987,224 1,606,165 138,160 8,6 
1925 3,093,054 1,678,118 154,799 9.2 
1926 3, 216, 612 1,725,276 175,442 10.2 
1927 3,348,788 1, 649,9 59 177,638 10.8 
1928 3,756,638 1,809,797 178,443 9.9 
1929 4,199,764 1,995,110 186,402 9.3 
1930 3, 530,240 1,410,147 169,382 12.0 
1931 3,093,440 1,057, 749 118,060 11.2 
1932 2,087,680 476,221 54,396 ll.4 
1933 2,322,880 381,285 46,854 12.3 
1934 2,943,360 474,810 48,216 10.2 
1935 3,422, 720 760,996 64,108 8.4 
1936 4,032,000 1,229,031 9 5, 968 7.8 
1937 5,252,800 1,683,996 94,928 5.6 
1938 4, 580,800 . 1",115,625 93,486 8.4 
Subtotal 
1919-1938 61,990,638 24,399,584 2,487,498 10.2 
1939 4,869,760 1,456, 638 87,970 6.0 
1940 5,602,240 1,756,172 90,396 5.1 
1941 6,048,000 1,932,144 92,880 4.8 
1942 6,272,000 2,160,122 91,358 4.2 
1943 6,076,000 2,181,636 93,528 4.3 
1944 5,686,000 1,945,098 84,842 4.4 
1945 4,758,000 1,645,788 60,802 3.9 
1946 4,078,000 1,217,474 43,326 3.6 
Subtotal 
1939-1946 43,391,000 14,195,072 645,102 4.5 
Grand 
Total 161,,399,626 66,924,524 . 9,646, 703 14.6 
• 
to subsidies and their etteot upon the production ot copper. 
Ot .'!!!! !!!.!! .!!!.\! Decline ,$!!: !!!! First Major 
Domestic Copper PrOducing ~ 
Althougn the existence ot rich copper properties 
was known in 1820• it was 1n the early 1840's before copper 
prospecting and mining opened up in MiChigan. Early booma 
and speculative periods hampered the stability of this area, 
and it was still faced with tremendous transportation and 
development problems at the beg1nning ot the Civil war, 
1. !!:! Impact ,2! !!£ £!'! _e Infant Industry 
During the Civil war, production fell, due mainly 
to a labor shortage caused by a drawing away ot men because 
of unsatisfactory working conditions, increasing wage rates 
in other industries, a deterioration of the quality and 
stability of labor, and the demands of the Army for men, 
28 
The war-stimulated price rise of copper resulted in an in-
crease in developmental work which did not result in an 1m· 
mediate production of copper, which was needed, but did draw 
scarce labor from producing mines. Assuming that the national 
wartime objective was the short run increase in oopper produc-
tion, development work was a definite misallocation of labor 
resources. Similar conditions arose during the period of 
World War I but did not prevail during World war II. 
war strains in the form of higher costs for labor 
and materials besan to oatch up with profits and by 1865, with 
the ending ot the wal", pricee began to tall and output went 
down with thea. The poet-war depreaaion ot 1867-71 brought 
the lowest domeatio pl"ioea eiDOe 1851 due partly to impol"te 
etimulated during the Civil war and partly to tbe diepoaition 
by the Federal government ot eome 5 ,ooo tone ot copper hoa 
old war material. Conae~ent retrenchment led to reduction 
ot labor toroea, atoppage ot develop .. ntal work, concentration 
ot miner• on rieher orea, and in aome oaaea to leaaing ot 
mines on a royalty baaia. 
2• Pirat Protective Tariff 
Theae price oriaea led to a clamor tor tariff pro-
tection, and the induetry reeeived the benefit ot ita firat 
protection to the amount ot t1Te cent• a pound in 1869•* 
Since the meaaure waa ilapoaed a\1 a time when 141ch1gan dom-
inated production, tbia permi\lted the maintenance of domeetic 
price• above world prioee to about the amount of the taritt. 
'l'bil prioe adYantage led tile ll1eh1gan produoera to torm a pool 
ot fl"iendly prodnce!'a ao •• .to maintain thia leYel. The biBb 
pricea increaaed pl'Oduotion gene!'ally and the aurplue wae 
dumped abPoad in order to maintain domeatic prioea. Shortly, 
inoreaaing production of minee outaide ot Michigan and toreiga 
reaction to dumping reaulted in the loaa of part ot tbe taritt 
advantage and in 4iaintegrat1on ot thia pPioe control arrange-
ment. 
* S, P• 46 
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:So Sbtul .2! Labor 1n MiObif5aD 
Before the Clvil War aad immediately thereafter, 
the major .t'aetor of' oost in the lllining 1nduatl')' waa tor labO!'. 
Sinoe early oompaay tia.anoial reports seldom gave wage pay-
menta, it waa dittioult to •••••• their exaot importance. 
Two ea!'ly reporta indicated wase paymenta aa aooount1DC tor 
about 36 per oent of' total expenditures. ~hie aeeaa low, 
and eatimatea .tor var1oua miaea in the 60's aet 45-55 per 
oent aa more reaaonable tisur••• 
The wages ot Miohigan lllinere throughout the lllidd.h 
ot the 19th Century continued to exceed tho .. .tor 811111111.1' 
types ot wo!'k 1n the Baet and in nearby iron mining tielda.# 
Gradually, the frontier type ot living oonditiona diaappeared 
and .aoh more aettled living with conveniences provided by 
the mining oompanlea cave fUrther advantages to labor locally. 
Paternaliam beoame a policy of' the indUatry aa boua1ng and 
landa tor building homes were provided, company atorea were 
opened, and aehoola, hoapUala, ehurohea and l1bJ:oar1ea were 
auba1dised. 
The llline opel'atOI'a had deo1ded in the poat 01v1l 
Wal' period that oolleotive aotion by workers would not be 
perlllitted, eapeoially attiliaUon with the growing national 
union movement in lllnea. A• a result of' grievances arialng 
during this period, the area had ita tirat atrlke in 1872. 
After three week• and .... Yiolenoe, it oollapaed when aol-
diera moved in. Ho other ailllilar labor di.t'tioultiea were 
# Table III, P• 81 
Year 
-
1841 
1883 
1860 
1864 
1866 
TABLE III 
Monthly Kiohisan Wages ror Copper Miners COmpared 
with Was•• ror Iron Miaera in the last 1848-1866 (in dollan) · 
New Jeraex 
19tl50 
ae.oo 
26.00 
65.00 
42.90 
Indua!n 
Penn•zlVa.rd! 
12.75 
so.eo 
24.70 
44.20 
45.50 
IUchigan Copper 
'M1ohican Iron 
'Minnesota Iron 
Detroit (general wase) 
Montana Copper 
.~risona Copper 
Industry 
Michigan Copper 
Michican Iron 
Minnesota Iron 
Montana Oopper 
Arhona Ooppe:l." 
lttchigan Copper 
Michigan Iron 
Minnesota Iron 
Michigan Copper 
Miohipn Iron 
Minnesota Iron 
Ariaona Copper 
Copper Industry 
Henry D1Btlr1ot 
_.N~ew~Y~O~l'~k-·---- !10hif!n 
26o00 30e00 
52.50 34o00 
32t50 33.00 6s.oo 65.oo 
42.90 53.00 
Average Daily Wage 
All &nplozees 
N~L 
2o28 
2.37 
2.02 
3.87 
3.40 
1919 
$3.76 
6o38 
5.59 
5.03 
th62 
1924 
·-$3.76 . $3.98 
6.38 . 4.43 
5o59 · 4.56 
$4.03 
4.70 
s.lo 
5.55 
5o27 
~2.'74 
3e82 
3.82 
... 
19!9 
$4.03 
4.70 
SolO 
1939 
-
$3.31 
4.47 
4.85 
5o17 
4.63 
soune - Mlohipn Copper and Boston Dollara, P• 198 
experienced until, in the last decades of the century, 
Knights of Labor became active enough to cause some strikes 
and counteraction by the companies in setting up compaD7 
unions. At this ti111t1 1 heavy immigration or non-English 
speaking workers from Europe complicated the difficulties 
of the employer-employee relationship. Frequently short 
strikes resulted in compromise wage increases and sometimes 
in refUsal to take back the strike leaders. OUtput was not 
greatly affected by theae strikes, but they d1d indicate a 
great deal or underlying d1seat1efaotion due in part to his-
toric opposition to unions, in part to nationality and lan-
guage difficulties, and to aucceeetul unionization in nearby 
iron ore fields and in the Western copper fields. 
Michigan's richer ores were becoming depleted with 
the passage of time and production per man was falling so 
definitely that this area became 1noreaa1ngly dependent upon 
a low wage seale 1n order to keep its competitive position, 
The age of the area, the settled living conditions and the 
industry's paternalism tended to provide an adequate labor 
supply at low wages. As the industry became more marginal, 
eo did wages, and with minor deviations this condition per-
sisted. The depression wh1oh besan in 1929, i.ntensified. 
this situation. Even though 1n some years of this decade 
Michigan's proportion of coppe? produced in the United States 
increased, production waa still relatively so low that condi• 
tiona ware very depressed. Emplo,aant was at a new low and, 
a& 
althouiJb. labor !ld.pation waa a taotor, une!IIPlo~nt wu ao 
h11h that 1111D1ng wagea nn nportM to be near the level ot 
w.P .A. wagea.H 
'l'he t1M waa ripe tor un1on1aat1on, and in th1a 
uea Whioh had auooeaatully reaiated organisation, the IntutJ.•• 
national Union ot Mine, Mill and Smelter workers o.x.o. 
opened a drive. In 1939 tor the tirat time auooeaa waa ex-
perienced at aome ot the aaaller properties paying the lo ... t 
wages. Ko aooaer had eleotlona been held and the c.x.o. oer• 
t1t1ed than. the problea arose ot inability ot these coapan1ea 
to pant wage 1noreaaea at O\U"''ent oopper prices. In Feb-
l'Ual7t 1941, the situation oaae to a head when wortera voted 
to strike tor higber pay. Since both labor and aanageaent 
reoogniaed that the aain aolut1on to the 1aaue waa Whether 
or not the goTernaent waa prepared to IJI'Illlt 11 aubaid;y, a 90· 
da;y truoe waa agreed upon paDding olaritioation ot the goTern-
ment'e intentione. 
4. Faotora £id1y !!!!, 112!!& Maturitlt .!! !!!!. Mioh1san Area 
Even thougb M1oh1san'• proportion ot total domeat1o 
produotion waa declining, due to the r1ae ot weatern produc-
tion, th1a area had a long period ot JBat'!D'itl;y, High coppell' 
pf'ioea were a aajor taotorj In the early part ot the 20th 
Oentur;r up to and 1nolud1ng 19181 a aeller'• aarket prevailed 
to a gl/'eater desree than eTeJ/' before. Thia peJ/'1od opened 
I ~able III, P• II 
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with tbe Russo-Japanese war, oo~ered years ot major business 
activity, and oloaed with tour years or wartime prosperity 
ot wozold War I. During these years, world output doubled 
while United States' consuaption increased over two and one-
halt times. During six ot these years, the average annual 
quotation on Lake copper was over 16.5 cents a po~. The 
total output tor the fourteen years was valued at about 18.6 
cents a pound 1n contrast to lS.l cents a pound tor the 
period 1883-1904. All-U• peaks were reached tor Mbh1gan 
in output, value or output, eaployment, and dividend payments. 
Integration ot operations by merger and purchase 
and the speeding up ot technological ohanges also oontributed 
to this stability. Among technological changes was the intro-
duction ot one-man light drills about 1913. 'l'his drill helped 
reverse a falling trend in prodnetivity of underground workers 
dating back to 1905 and tor many OOIIlP&nies coats were out bask 
to those of 1910 or even earlier. Milling improvements auoh 
as finer grinding, leaching whish promised to double antie1-
pated recovery from retreat.ant ot sands, and raeovery of 
copper from slimes by the troth flotation process were among 
the major developments. The ~aet of these was twofold. 
First, copper reco~ery par ton was inereased substantially 
and second, 1t beoame possible to work 40 years of ac8UIIIIllated 
tailings from some minas at a very substantial profit. 
These factors tended to obscure conditions wbioh 
ware shortly to bring about a substantial decline in M1oh1gan's 
poait1on in the induetry. Tbe riae of production 1n low. 
coat weetern minea aDound 1910 had a major impact upon older 
produoera. Their coste were eo low that the inueaae in 
average ooata tor the induatry aa a whole was retarded with 
the result that an increa•ing proportion ot older mines in 
all aeotiona were beoo~ng ~g1nal.# P.Pom theae data it 
1e obvioua that average protUa per pound ot copper produced 
in Michigan were falling relative to the trend 1n the indue-
try u a whole and that, 1f d81111lDd waa to alaoken aube11an-
t1ally, Lake production would probably decline in greater 
proportion than the 1n4uatry. Dellllln4 na not to alackan, 
however, due to the outbreak ot world war I. The demand 
rla1ng trcm it was a great atimalant to produotion ot copper 
inoluding that of marginal ~nee. 
The effeota ot the outbreak ot world war I were 
dmllar to thou in the early montlha or the Civil war. top. 
per pr1cea, being deter~ned in world markets, fell 1n a few 
montha trom 13.3 oenta a pound to llo3 cents a pound in Nov-
ember 1914 when international linel ot trade became dieorgani-
aed. In 1915 they roee to 19 oenta, in 1916 the average price 
waa 28.1 oenta and by the Fall of 191,, a peak ot 36 centa 
waa reached. Under the intluenoe of auoh prioea, Michigan'• 
production reached an all-time peak in 1916, declined but 
alightly 1n 1917, but fell aubatantially in 1918 under govern-
I Table IV, P• 30 
'l'ABLE IV 
llchisan Coats Compared with Those ot the 
Rest or the Domestic Industry, 1909-1918 (Ooat Figures 1n Cents Per Pound) 
Year 
1009 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
101'1 
1918 
Avere.ge 
M1oh1sp InpaW 
9.9 
9.9 
9.6. 
10.'1 
13.8 
11.5 
9.6 
12.4 
15.6 
18.9 
e.a 
a.e 
s.a. 
lhS 
10.2 
t.s 
e.s 
10.4 
12.9 
u.s 
Porphyr,-
Mines 
9.8 
8.4 
B.1 
a.7 
9.3 
s.s 
7.9 
9.3 
12.'1 
14.0 
Source .. Miohigan Ooppel" and Boston Dollnra, p.le'1 
:so 
ment price control •. !! Prioe control of' this period will be 
treated in detail in Section III• particularly aa to ita 
bearing upon price control ~~eaau:rea of' the periods n are 
studying. 
5. Post World !!! l In4U•!rl Ada1n1atered Qont:rol Plans 
The end of' the tirat soYernment price control act 
of' copper brought the industry face to face with the need 
tor continued controla of' aome kind due to the huge world• 
wide stocks of' copper. Tbeae were estimated to be on Jan-
uary l, 1919, 2.2 billion poUnds, or approximately twioe the 
annual aYerage production ot the decade 1911·20• The mining 
induatry ot the United States took oYe:r world leadership ot 
a control end cuPta1lment proptam which involved a cartel ot 
the major world producing countries. Firat attempts to dis-
pose or domestic surplus stocks were made under the authority 
ot the Webb-Pomerene Act ct 1918, wb!oh permitted domestio 
producers to e.ct in comb1llat1on in the export trade without 
tear of p:roaeoution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, aa long 
as domeat1c price was not atfeeted. Export quotaa p:roved in-
adequate, so Pedu.ced output became the next step. By 1924, 
the oaPtel diaaolved due mainly to liquidation ot excess 
atocka and because ot conflicting 1ntereata. 
Ano\ber cartel waa formed soon attar, beoauae the 
awell1ng output ot Oh1le and Rhodeaia in 1924-25 bald the 
# Table II• pagea 20 & 21 
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world price down •. Under the Webb·Po~rene Act, another 
export group waa tormed tor international action with the 
purpoae ot aetting an "ottieial" world price. For the tirat 
-.o yeara ot its operation, prices stayed around 13 cents a 
pound and in 1929 went tirat to 18 cents and finally to 24. 
In April 1929, they were stabllis~ and held tor a fUll year 
at 17.775 cents, despite the collapse ot the stock market 
and strenuous protests ot consumers; particularly abroad. 
The tallacioua reasoning ot the Webb-Pomerene Aot, that a 
cartel prioe.in toreiga market would not atteot prices in 
the United States, helped to maintain prices at a much higher 
level than justified by the greatly reduced coats in many 
aeotors ot the industry. In the beginning, overinvestment 
caused ettorta at control, but later on, control tended to 
preserve the atatua ot overinvestment in the world copper 
induati'Y• 
6. Mieh1san1 s n.cl1ne AfSdn Poetponed 
Since the Michigan indDatl'y was not in the cartel, 
its pl'oduction was not reatrioted. Price maintenance at thia 
hi8h level tended to postpone and obscure ita declining com-
petitive position. To l'eap -.x'mnm benefits trom these pricea, 
aeleotive mining waa greatly intensified. This working ot 
ohly r1oh ores reversed the coat price relationah1p tempora-
rily with an annual Ol'e production per underground worker of 
9:51000 pou.nda ooaparec! with 351 000 1n the late '80's and a 
prewar we1gbt ot about 151000 pounda. This pl'act1ce plua 
31 
reclamation ot waste ores aDd sands made production profit-
able at the prices or this period, since retreatment plants 
were small users or labor. 
7. ComPl1oations ot the Dee:e, .. ion.!!:.!. 
The depression began an era wbioh revealed the 
weakened position ot the IUJ'&i.ll&l industry ot Miab.1gan. It 
oould not have oome at a worse t1 .. tor world copper producers 
who had just COll!llenoed 11o ptapple with one ot the moat serious 
threats or overproduction ever experienced. New depoaih in 
Rhodesia and Canada were beglnnift! 11o oome into prodaotion. 
Canadian output wu a by .. product ot n1okel produotion and, 
along with the Rhodesian output, was tied up with politics 
then involved with empire buildlft! and the rapid exploitation 
ot new sources or wealth. ~hie made production control prac-
tically impossible. SUpple .. ntina this growing production 
was a new infant industry • the Vnited States scrap induatr7 
which in 1918 contributed &7 per cent as maoh copper aa do.es-
t1c primar7 producers, 63 per oeat as !lllloh in 1989, and, in 
the worst years or the depression, more than primar7 produoera. 
In the t1el4 or ROTernaent, a taritt was again esta-
blished, but it had little etteot upon prices sinoe the United 
States malnhined an export balaDOe troa 1933 through 1938o# 
&3 
An N.R.A. Copper Code,. adopted after great: delay due to the 
setting or quotas, also complicated this eituat1on by eett1ng 
annual aalee tor priaar7 pl'oduoers at 24.6 per oent of oapaoity. 
I 9able v, pase 34 
'l'.ABLB V 
OIDD S'l'ATBS :ft>REIGN 'l'RADE IN A.JfD 
CONSUMPTION OP l!fBW COPPER, 1918-1946 ( m1111on• ot pouadll) 
Apparent 
Year I!!!pOl'tB E:l.p!rta aonau!I!J)tion 
1916 8 '717 1,479 
1917 '1 1,031 1,396 
1918 :sa teo 1,661 
1919 31 438 914 
1920 109 551 1,053 
1981 69 596 611 
1922 103 653 897 
1983 161 '789 1,300 
1984 146 1,008 1,355 
1926 100. 968 1,401 
1926 171. 856 1,570 
1927 102. 982 1,423 
1928 85 949' 1,608 
1929 134. 812 1,77S 
1930 86 . 594 1,266 
1931 1'74 406 eo a 
1938 168 222' 519 
1933 10 2"f 6'79 
1914 55 585 645 
1935 36 521 883 
1936 9 "1 1,312 
193'7 15 590 1,390 
1938 4 741 814 
l9H 31 746 1,430 
1940 137 '713 s,o17 
1941 694 907 3,283 
19.f.8 803 163 :5,356 
1941 806 356 3,004 
1944 986 118 3,008 
1945 1,061 10'1 2,810 
1946 309 105 2,482 
So\U'oe • JU.ohi@llll Oopper and. Boa ton 
Dollar a, P• 191 
In this we see the beg1Dn1ng ot dlsUnot1on between the 
lal'pat pl"oducers and the rest of the iftduatl"Yt a diatino-
tion which became a major factor in the period of pl"ice con-
, \Pol end production stimulation of the seoond World War. 
'l'he big three of coppOl" ( Aaaoollda, XeDnOcott, and Phelps 
Dodge) were held to prodQotion qgotas ot 20 per cent while 
the rest of the industry Yaried upward inYersely according 
to capacity. Thus the NoR•A• Copper Code tended to tl"eeae 
producers inYersely in terma of thelr 1933 relatiYe status 
and to allocate the buPden of pestriotion on ability to bear 
it rather than on a ba1i1 or errio1ency in production. Prim-
ary producers were soon obliged to reduoe their quotas fUrther 
for the benefit of custom ameltera and producer• of secondary 
copper. After a relatiYely abort period of operation, the 
N.R•A• wu deolared uaeonatituUoaal by tlb.e SU:pre1118 Court or 
the United Stat••• 
The cartel, the Tariff, the Code, the oontrola 
again tended to benefit marginal produoera. In 1'aot, during 
this period the relaUn position ot IUchigan improYed, tor 
in 1929 it accounted fol" 9.3 per eent ot the United States 
output, and during the worst yean of tb.e depression, 1930·3•, 
ita share was from 10.2 to 12.3 per canto# HoweYer, due to 
many factors, among which mainly were exbaustion or exploita-
tion ores and reolama,1on aands• i'• production in 1937 waa 
but 5.6 per oent of the oountr7'• •otsl. 
I Table II, pages 20, 21 
a. Impending Price Controls ~ Prewar Period 
In october 1940, the price of copper was sto.biliaed 
by informal afP'&ement between the government and the large 
domestic producers at 11.8 cents a pound. In April 1941• the 
leading companies were requested to bold that price until con-
trol machinery oould be developed. It was obvious that the 
Michigan producers, faced with a strike for increased wages 
and operating under a truce with labor, could not even main• 
tain output let alone increase it at this price. 
As early as 19401 varioua local business groups were 
protesting againat stabilisation of prices, and a Copper Price 
Commission appointed by the Governor of Michigan was engaged 
in investigation of wartime production potentialities of the 
' district. Thie Commission concluded that a 40 per cent in• 
crease in output within two years could be expected if the 
industry was paid 15 cents a pound for its copper. This should 
be noted well !or subsequent oompariaon with actual accomplish-
menta. 
Here, in this marginal area, we see shaping up cir-
cumstances and pressure for either higher prices and no stabi• 
lization, or fixed prices, a subsidy for the benefit ot all 
marginal producers. In September 19411 the Metal Reserves 
Corporation, a Federal corporation operating under the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation Act began purchasing the entire 
output of three laree produoers of the area at 15 cents a 
pound. Th1a waa auperaeded by a oontract signed in october, 
1941 tor their entbe ou\pa\ ail their • .,.rage ou11-ot-pooket 
ooata baaed on the tira11 halt or 19411 adjuated to allow tor 
a dollar-a-day inoreaae 1n wagea plua a profit ot one oen11 a 
pound. In thia unner, aeleoU'te pricing tor copper waa 
initiated eYen betore the VnUed statea entered Wol'ld Wu II. 
III H1atory or Price Control ot Copper in tht 11n1ted Statea 
Ao World .!I!: 1• 1917·18 
To thia point, the aajor attempts at price control 
ot copper by priYate inter••'- alnoe ita popular uae in the 
19th Century haYe been preaented. Moat ot thlae have been 
baaed upon reatriction ot produetion or thl maintenance ot 
prices and protita. All tailed to achieve laating ettect. 
The problema invol'ted in the control ot pricea in the tace ot 
expanding war demanda are Yery ditterent baaioally trom thoae 
met 1n a.ny ot the abo.,. aituat1ou. 
At the outbreak ot WOrld War I, the United Statea 
was the world 1 a largeat aingle producer ot copper and alao 
produced the bulk ot the world'• outpu.t.# Du.e to war require-
menta ot the Alliaa, demand waa outrunning aupply tor two yeara 
bator• we entered the oontlict, and eleotrolyt1o copper which 
was 16 cents a pound before 19141 waa 35.7 cents 1n March 1917o* 
It waa evident that the aituation would grow progreaaively 
worse aa our partio1pat1on inoreaaed, t!rat aa a belligerent 
and aecondly aa an araenal tor our All!••• 
# Table II 1 pages 801 21 
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1. !h!, Basic Problem Facing ~ War Industries l}oard 
The Wnr I.nduatries Board was the offiOial govern-
ment agency responsible for the production of war ms.teriale. 
Maximum possible production of copper became the first problem 
to engage the attention of this Board headed by Bernard Baruoh. 
There were two basic schools ot thought. One was that since 
incr.eased production was the most important goal, a rise in 
prices should not be interfered with but that accumula.tion ot 
profits should be taken care or through an excess profits tax. 
The other thesis was that there was a limit to the production 
which might be stimulated by hilh prices and, if advances in 
this and other commodities were allowed to take their course, 
not only would inflation be threatened but the readjustments 
incident to peace would bring catastrophe with them and would 
make it next to impossible to finance the war. 
2. Temporary Voluntary Price Stabilization 
Pending resolution of a policy on the subject, an 
appeal was made on March 20, 1917• direct to large producers 
and smelting interests by tho war Industries Board for a price 
on a specific amount of copper needed by the armed forces. 
They agreed to deliver 45.5 million pounds of copper at 16.67 
cents a pound which was the average selling price obtained by 
the United Metals Smelting Company 1n the decade 1907-1916. 
As a result, copper prices which were then 35.74 cents a pound 
began to decline, In June 19171 the War Department needed 
601 000 1000 pounds and asked the Pederal Trade Oommisa1on to 
examine 'be ourrent prodaotion eoeta ot the metal then aell· 
ing at 32.57 oenta. 
Shortly after th1a 1 the Seeretary ot the fiavy 
aMounoed that he would pay 75 per ee.nt down tor oopper d 
25 oe.nta a pou.n4, OJ' 18 3/• oeta, and would hold the other 
25 per oent in abeyanoe ~ng the Federal 'l'Z'ade Oollllld.adon 
Coat ot Pl'oduot1on RepoJ't. tbia led to the aaaumption that 
st 
the sovernaent inteaded to tiz tbe price at 25 oenta. lmme• 
41ately labor objeoted dUe to the lUIIlaual ftge ayatem preYa1l• 
1ng, by whioh ainel'a were paid on a sliding wage aoale adjuatled 
to the price of copper. A m1.nlmaa wage of $3.50 per eight-hour 
day tor minora and undersrouad wo.kera and $4.50 tor .. ohanioa 
waa &WU'anteed. ThS.a applied when copper aold below 15 oenta 
a pouad and inoreaaed 25 oenta per day tor eaoh two-cent ad• 
vance per pound in the pr1oe ot oopper above 16 oenta. ~r 
over one year wagea had been baaed upon 27 oent and above oop. 
per, ao that Jlinera were receiving $5 • $5.25 per da7 and 
.. ohanioa $6ell • $6.50. Tbe7 threatened to atrike it wagea 
were reduced and did ao wherever thia took place, 
Produoera continued to tupply the BayY but retuaed 
to bill at the 18.75 oe.nta ottered, The War lnduatriea Board 
became oonv1noed that thia baa1c price fallaoy would curtail 
produotion and asreed to advanoe 22,5 oenta to the produoera 
and ar~e over the 2.1 oenta re .. lning. 
s. Dlaouaeion Prettd1sg Price Fi!iPS 
In September 1917, the Pederal Trade Commiaaion 
reported ita coat ot production tindinga. The War In4Uailr1ea 
Boal'd athr atu4y ot thia report deoided to tix the price ot 
ita needs at 28 oenta and called repreaentat1Yea ot the cop. 
per induatry to Waahlngton tor oonaultation. The repreaenta-
tiYea were told that the 22-oent prioe would appl7 tor a 
apeoltio period at the end ot 'lfhioh it would 'be rniaed up. 
wal'd or downwardJ that aoM ot the oopper would be allocailed 
tor soYeraaental use, ao .. would go to the Allies, and aome 
to doMatio eonau..raJ aDd thail wagea would haY• to ata7 at 
the then exiatiag leYel ia apite ot a doWDW&rd moYe .. nt 1n 
the alid1ng aoale. 
The copper indaatry repreaentat1Yea objeoted claim-
lag that (1) the7 oould not control the price to the public d 
below 2S cen11a a pouD41 (B) amall hlp-ooat pro«uoera would not 
Toluataril7 eo-operate in aelling at the fixed price, (3) the 
produotion ot small htgb-ooat produoera waa needed and the7 
could not operate at 28 oenta, (') wages, up 50 per cent oYer 
1915, were a large part ot their coat ot produotton, and (5) 
unreat and labOr ahorta1es milbt oall for iaoreased wages dur• 
lag thia period. !'heir memorandua oontimled, "While sosae low-
oost produoera will abDw a large profit at 22 oenta, soma ot 
· the largest and praettoall7 all ot the small p.podueers cannot 
ahow more than the uaual peaoett.. profit at that pr1oe - aDd 
1t depletion ot minoa ia oonoerned, their profit would bo lesa 
than normal. We 'bel1oYo it to be to the 'beat 1ntereat ot tho 
so•ernmont to pa7 25 oenta a pound and to take all produotion, 
retaining what is needed and selling the bnlance to the 
public at 25 cents.~• 
This proposal waa not acceptable to the government. 
Producers made a compromise offer of 23o5 cents a pound agree-
ing that, if t~s was aooepted, they would pledge the copper 
induat~y almost as a Whole to use every possible means to 
secure ma:d11111m production and to !ilainta1n the present wage 
soale. 
4o Price Fixed ~ !{ar :tn,duatries Board 
The compromise otter waa accepted by the War IDdus· 
tries Board on September 21, 1917, and the price of copper 
was fixed at 23•5 cents tor f'Oilr months originally. It na 
maintained at this price, however, until July 1918 when ad• 
vances in treigbt rates and inoreaaes in costa of labor caused 
amaller prOdueera such severe loasea that the price was in· 
creased to 26 cents a pound. This price was me.inta.ined a1'ter 
the Armistice in November until January 11 1919. 
5o Effect £! Price Control !n Prod!gtion 
The price control program proved quite effective 
in maintaining output for the 1DdUatry as a whole. United 
States production reached a peak of lo93 billion pounds in 
1916, declined to loBS billion in 19171 and rose again to leil 
billion in 1918. The Federal Trade Commission and the United 
States Geo1osical survey haTe concluded, "The reduction and 
pegging of prices did not hinder the maximum production prao-
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tioable during the war. And even 1\u'ther higher pdoea 
would hAve encouraged \he uae or ~•h labor proapecting or 
development to the detr1Mnt ot higbly productive adnea. 
Protita were very high at low-ooat Western m1nea and it se ... 
probable that the price ot 13.5 was unneceaaar1ly high•"* 
The etteot ot prioe control on Marginal produoera 
can be viewed by the dab aocWMllated tor the Jliobigan produc-
ins area which waa definitely marslnal. Froa a production 
v;t.ewpoint, Ua outlput reached an all-tilae high in 1916 at un-
restricted prices, waa practically maintained in 19171 aDd 
tell about 14 p~ cent in 1918 UD4tr oontrolled prioea.H It 
1a, even probable that the decline in prodllot1on would have 
oontinued into 1919 it the war had oonti~ed and copper had 
r8111ained at 26 cents a pound. Pri.oe control in theae areaa 
did not pel'lllit proapeot1ng or the opening or new lllines. Ifl 
alao reaulted in almoat complete oeasation ot development 
work at prOduolq adnea •. After April 191 'I, 18 companies 
•.topped opening new pound and by .nme, 1918, IIWlagera or 
aaall propert1ea aerioualy oonaidered shutting down. It ia 
probable that aim1lar ooa41tiona prevailed in practically all 
marginal areaa. 
ll'Poa the viewpoint of allocation of ~bor in this 
area thia waa ~eairable. It it had been eaaential to maintain 
production tor the long run, rather than for leu \han no 
year a, aou cha.ngea in prioe or procedure would have been 
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neoeasary. One poee1b111ty d1eeuee~ wae the taking over of 
the mines by the govern.8nt, 1n order to fOrce a greater allo• 
eation of labor to the rioheet mines. Solution wae complioated 
by the ~aot that eoae marginal areas were .uttering from an 
acute labor ahortage and hiatorlcally low wage acalea. Suoh 
a heavy wage increase would have been required to attraot 
labor that a aubetantial inoreaae in 11he national pr1u of 
copper would have been neee .. ary. This 1J011ld have been oo-
pletely unjuatifiable tor the profitable Western mines and 
might have opened up developMntal and exploration work whiob 
Would have been a eevere strain upon or1t1oal labor oonditiona. 
Selective pricing as an alternative was diecuaaed by the Price 
Fixing Committee of the War Induatriea Board which rejected it, 
partly because it did not believe in aubaidiaing units whioh 
oould not operate a.t peacet11118 prieea. 
Bo Pre-World War l! Mogillattion !Ia Price Control Plans 
lo Co!l!easiogal ktgislation 
The experience of World War I led Congreaa 1n 1980 
to enlars• upon the National Defense Aot of 1916 and authorised 
the Aasiatant Seeretary of War to lnetitute and take active 
charge of 111 11 day planning (1) through a Planning Bra~ to 
make etudiee and plana tbr wartiae mobilisation of induatry 
·and (2) through ilhe Army and 'Navy Joint Munitions Board to 
etudy and eo-ordinate the needa of the '-o aervloee, eo aa to 
prevent the dieaatroua oompetitlon in procuring auppliea whleh 
had orippled both aervioea in the zoeoent war. Noilhing IIUOh 
was done, and a decade passed before a.n "W' day plan began 
to take any definite shape. 
2o Hearings £.!! the Firat ~ Submitted 
In 1931 the first plan was submitted to the War 
Policies Comm1sa1on, created by a joint reaolution or Consreaa 
ot the same year. The hearings on this first plan opened 
March 5, 1931 and continued through May 1931 with secretary 
Of W~ Patrick. J o Hurley aet1ng U Ohai1'1118no* 
The main proponent of price control plane tor "M" 
day was Berna.rd Baruch who Galled upon his practical exper-
ience as head ot the War In4uatries Board of World War I an4 
upon h1a ideas end plana drawn aubaeqQent to that experience. 
In addressing the war Policies co~aa1on, he developed the 
theory that some norm must be chosen against wblch to measure 
the inflation of price and profit. The price structure as it 
existed on some antecedent date ot a declaration of war on 
which aupply and demand seemed mostly in balance was ind1· 
cated as the desirable one. !he lPeezing of all prices, wagea 
dividends, interest, rents, etc. in the whole price structure 
of the nation at that level by proclamation was the heart of 
his proposal. After this was done, he developed, adjust-
ments would then be reqQ1red and should be me.de 1n some in- . 
d1vidual cases ~o take care ot low-coat and high-coat pro-
ducers whose output is required 1n war time. To maintain 
the production of hish•Coat producers, either a high price 
•• 
or n bonus would be requlred and, 11' high. prlce wae chosen, 
then the excess profits of the low-coat producer mast be recap. 
tuJoed. In World War I, the bonus ple.n wa.a rejected and a high 
price plus excess profits tax ohoaen.• 
The propoaals disoueee4 contemplated that application 
ot prioe control would take place before inflationary forces 
distorted price relationships and standards. Prices aet WOUld 
be maximum and any price control commission would be called 
into action only when a change 1n fixed maximums was imperative. 
It was also contemplated .thet "M" day tor prioes 
would not be set specifically by date because hiatoey hu lhcwn 
that the first panic ot war ao atteota tbe normal channels ot 
trade that price depression 1s registered tlrst. A price 
t.eese under these conditions would not represent a desirable 
level and could not fairly be chosen as a maximum one. LeaV• 
in& the date tree would permit the selection to represent more 
truly a normal price relationship. 
3o MisUDderatandins ~ Opposition 
Daring the hearings there was so much misunderstand• 
ing and opposition as to the price stabilisation proposals ot 
Mro Bal"11ch that he had to lllake aD011her presentation to olar11'y 
and support them. some felt tbat demand and supply should be 
lett to operate freely, others felt that excess profits taxes 
alone could atop inflation, and others chose selective control 
ot i~1Yidual prices aa adequate. Mr. Ba1"11.ch developed that 
war'• demande generally so oo~lioate \he workings of demand 
that supply factors are gPeatly diatort~, that excess prot1t 
taxes tend to teed inflation, aDd that price con11rol ot 1nd1· 
vidual or selective it..a was 1mppaot1cable and 1n many oases 
contiaaa11ory. "To put it in anotbe:r1way, when we impoae, upon 
a general price aohedule in a fairl7 normal ata11e, an 1nt1u.aoe 
tor rapid general inflation, and at 11he aame time apply reprea-
a1on to a single commodity we automatically and almost instantly 
deatroy the ezohance Yalue of that collll!I041 ty. ", aa1d Mr. Ba1'11oh•* 
Durinc World War I partial price atabilisation did 
not atop inflation and only in tbe caae of non-terroua metala 
was there any aucceaa 1n r.UciDg any ot the pr1no1pal cOIIIIIO• 
dit1es to their normal poaition 1n the general pattern ot pr1cea. 
4. i!!attioa 
Opposed to the price sbbUisatloa plaa ot Kr. Bal'Uoh 
were many persona ot prollinenee ia the world of pu.blie attail's. 
Secretary ot War Iewton D. Baker, Colonel Leoaard P. Ayres, 
General Douglas MacArthur aad otbera were not conYinoed that 
ao draatic a plan preaented the only meana ot acoolllJil111h1ng 
the desired objecttivea. Moreover, the world aeeaed at peace 
and diatrust and d1al1ke ot sovera.ental controla ot any kind 
in our tne of eoono1117 were so deep that nx• plana tor pr1oe 
control never were concluded. 
s. Re•aot1va$1on!! Plann&ps UDder fhreat !!!!£ 
In Augud 19391 when 11he outlbreak or war 1n Burope 
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was imminent, a War Resources Board of seven members was 
appointed. This board drew up a1110ng other things a P:rice 
Control Authority plan which was not published by the Presi-
dent to whom it was submitted. 'l'he committee was disbanded 
in November 1939. 
On Ma.y 291 1940• the second day or the bettle of 
Dunkirk end after the fall ot Prance, the Council of National 
Defense, provided tor by a statute ot 19161 was authorised. 
Each or the seven members was intended to supply the Presi-
dent with expert information and advice in a specialised 
field of industrial and economic mobilisation. Leon Bender-
son, an economist and a member or the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, waa commissioner tor the Price Stabil1ae.tion Di• 
vision. He became the person mainly responsible for setting 
up the Price Control Agency of WOrld War II. 
4'7 
Price ;;;:;S,;;;;ch;e;;,;d;;,;uo:l:.::e;:;.s as .! Fore:runner g!, Price Oontroll 
The Price Stabilisation Division 1n the beginning 
was only advisory. The staff orsaniae.t1on watched price 
trends for signs of inflation of prices and tar e number of 
months made no attempts at direct controls. Indirectly, pend· 
ing the development of plana and principles, they did all they 
could to stimulate the production ot soods ln order to avoid 
price increases due to scarcities. 
Leon Henderson was convinced that effective price 
control must have legal authority and set at work oaretull;r to 
develop plana which could be auooesstully defended in court. 
In World War I there was no ap .. 1t1o statute on price control 
and what was done in this d1reot1on was accomplished by 
stretching the President's war authority, by persuaaion, oo-
eraion, prioritiea, and allocations. Since some prioea were 
getting completely out ot line, the t1rat of approximately 
one hundred ao•oalled •pries aohe4ulea• setting llax1Blm priaes 
was iaaued in FebruaP7, 1941. Although the .. carried :ao penal· 
ties for violationa, they were reaaonably auoceaatul aDd met 
with no legal challenges. 
On April 111 19411 Baeoutive Order 8734 eatablished 
the Office of Price Adm1n1atrat1on and Civilian supply aa a 
atop gap pending paaaage ot a atatuf-• On August 281 1941, 
another .li;zeoutlve Order tranaterred tlbe ciY1l1an supply tune- · 
tion to the Office ot Produotion Management!, leaving price 
control alone to the original a&•DOT• For a whole year begia-
ning JanuarT 1941 efforts were ·directed towards developing a 
price control bill and securing ita passage in Congress. Tbe 
Bouse paued 1tl just a few daTa before Pea.rl Harbor and the 
Senate soon attar 1n an atiiDaphere of war. It was passed in 
ita final form and aignad b7 the President on JanuaP7 31 1 1948. 
', ~ o. Grossly Inadepa'e SUpply and Excaeaive 
n.III8Dds fol' Copper Pre-world .!!! ll 
As early aa the last halt ot 1940, copper prodDoera 
were having difficulty meeting requtrementa tor the metal. 
The detenae requirements of the United States, of 1ta allies, 
and tor oiYilian uee exoeeded previoua oo~on reoorde by 
40 to 60 per oent. In lbe t1nal qaarter of 1940, when it be-
came apparent that produotion in t:hia country would be so 
inadequate, arrangements were made tor pUl'ohaae of the Latin• 
ftmerican production of American subsidiaries. Priorities were 
also granted Latin American copper mines to enable them to Ob• 
tdn neoeasery equipment and o~rating supplies more rapidly, 
In 1941 4emand was aocentue.ted when unbelievable 
plans for airplanes, tanka and small and large caliber 811111111• 
nition became known. It was soon obvious that civilian uae 
would have to be drastically restricted. on .rnne 1, 19411 
copper was placed under ma.Qdatory 1nduatry-wide control• by 
the setting aside of a producers pool to be allocated by the 
Director of Priorities. By means of a aeries of preferenoe 
ratings for defense orders, metal was alloce.ted before any 
became available for civilian use. 
The situation beeame more ·aer1oua when estimated 
supplies end requirements were eatimated tor 1941 and 1942 aa 
follows: 
SUpply 
Domeatio Produot1on 
Importa (Latin American) 
Other Imports 
Secondary Copper 
Demands· 
Military (including foreign} 
iaaential 01v111an 
Other Civilian (unreatrioted) 
1941 1942 
Short 'lona -
liUK>.ooo 
500,000 
100,000 
100,000 
1,650,000 
600,000 
400,000 
880,000 
1,1oo,ooo 
500,000 
100,000 
100,000 
1,soo,ooo 
1,ooo,ooo 
400,000 
1,1'70,000 
1,880,000 
Source • The Minerals Yearbook 19411 P• 94 
It waa obvioua t:ha t aoma long range plan would have 
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to be devised to stimulate maximum domeatic production. This 
became the joint problem of the war Production Board, the 
Office of Production Management, and the Office of Price A~ 
istration. 
D. StoR Gap Measures Preoedipg ,!!h! Premium Price !l!!n 
Stop gap measures received increasing attention. 
In the earliest atages of increasing demand, prices were not 
greatly effected because generally copper prodUction was not 
at capacity and manpower to increase it was readily available. 
The likelihood or our involvement in the war, the impact or 
our planned rearmament pro~am and the requirements arising 
fro~ the Land-Lease Act of March 1941 combined to hasten the 
conclusion that some form of governmental prioe control would 
be necessary. Particularly was this imperative for copper, 
one of the first materials to be affected by the atimulatina 
demands for war materials, the price of wh1oh had begun to in• 
crease at a nominal rate but wh1ch showed signa of peraiatin&•* 
1. Securing Increased SUpplies 
As a result, the first measures undertaken by the 
government to aesure etability·ot prices and prevent severe 
and crippling shortages were designed to maintain and 1noreaee 
the supply. The purchase of Latin-American copper haa been 
mentioned. The Navy Department was advised to seek ita re-
quirements in foreign oountPiea as far as possible. Produo-
tion was alao stimulated through direct negotiation with large 
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domestic produeers, many of Whom were induced to expand with• 
out government :financing or price inducement. 
2. Price stabilisation 
At the same time, d!reet steps were taken to stab! ... 
liae the price structure of non :ferrous metals. In September 
19401 an informal agreement was reached with major producers 
of copper to hold the market price to 12 cents a pound. CUs• 
tom smelters, however, contlaued to sell their copper at 
12 l/2 cents and above. The price stability achieved by this 
aSJ"eement waa soon jeopal'diaed by tactol'a whlch combined to 
limit current prodUction aDd inel'eaae costa. For many mines, 
increased production resulted in rapidly inoreaaing coats 
because lower grade ores involving more costly mining were 
resorted to. The absence ot wage eontrola resulted 1n labor 
coat increases which put preaaure upon prioe stability. 
3. Differential Pricins .and SUbsidies 
'l'o maintdn the 12-cent price, agreed to 1n.formall7, 
measures were adopted to m1nia1ae the ettect o:f these coat 1ft.. 
creases. 'l'hoae adopted involved government purohase o:f higb-
oost metals and the use o:f differential pricing techniques 
together with subsidy payments by the government. 
il 
such techniques and particularly differential prio• 
ingJ i.e., the ooncept thet coat d!tterencea should be retleo-
ted in differing maxiiiiWB prioea to7 various eegmen11a of output, 
had been discussed and specifically rejected by the Price 
Piz1nc Committee and War Indua11riea Board 1n World War I. At 
that time 1t was felt that the sovernment should not suba1-
d1ze productive unlts whiah could not operate oompetit1ve17 
in peace time. Thls viewpo1nt was dlacal'ded for thls period 
of emergency. 
4. Maximum Prlca FormallJ Established 
81 
In Auguat 1941 copper was placed under complete 
allocation by the Office of production Management (OPM)o This 
made a uniform calling price necessary to assist 1n allocation 
of thls essential metal. Therefore, a maximum price of 12 
cents was established in Price Schedule 15, issued Aug~~st 12, 
1941. 
Before imposition ot. this ceiling, the price con-
trol agency had conterred with Metals Reaerve Compan7, a aub-
aidiary of the Reconstruction Finance corporation, in an un-
successful effort to persuade that agency to purchase at 
higher than 12 cents a pound the marginal production of some 
Michigan mines which would be jeopardized by the 12-cent ceil-
ing. This company took the position that it was not empowered 
to purchase marginal copper and sell lt at .a loss. Officials 
of the company did agree, however, to try to find a purchaser 
for thls high•cost copper, and after many conferences, the 
Lend-Lease Administration was finally prevailed upon to pur. 
chase a specified amount of this copper at a price not hlgber 
than 16 cents a pound. Ful'thaP disagreements among the PJ'ln• 
cipals delayed the actual signing of the Michigan contracts 
until October, although asr .. ments with sevePal other high-
cost companies were reached earlier•* 
IV 'l'he Provisions for subsidy Payments Contained In 
A. !!!!, Ewlrsencz Price gontrol ,Ag! £.!. ~ 
Public Law 421 enacted January 301 1942 "to fur-
ther the national defense and seourity by checking specula• 
tive and excessive price rises, price dislocations, and 
inflationary tendencies, and for other purposes" provided, 
in Section 2, item e, for the maximum production or commo-
dities including strategic and critical materials. It readsl 
Whenever the Administrator determines that the maximum 
necessary production of any commodity is not being ob. 
tained or may not be obtained during the ensuing year, 
he may, on behalf of the United states, without regard 
to the provisions of law requiring competitive bidding, 
buy or sell at public or private sale or store or use 
such commodity in such quantities as he determines may 
be necessary to obtain the maximum necessary production 
thereof or otherwise to supply the demand thereof, or 
make subsidy payments to domestic pro~ucers of such 
commodity in such amounts and. in such monner and upon 
such terms and conditions as he determines to be neces-
sary to obtain the maximum production thereofr Provided, 
that in the case of any commodity which has heretofore· 
or may hereafter be defined aa a strategic or critical 
material by the President pursuant to section 5d of the 
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Reoonstruotion Finanoe Corporation Aot, as aiHnded, 
suoh detel'lllinations shall be •4e by the FedePal Loan 
Adminietratoz•, with the aPPl"'Val of' the Preddent, and, 
notwithetancU.ng an7 other prodaion of' thia Aot or lll17 
existing law·, IIUOh oollllll0dit7 ma7 be bought or aold, 
atored or uaed and auoh subaid7 payments to domestic 
produeers thertof' ma7 be paid onl7 b7 COPporations 
· created and orsaniaed purauant to auoh aeotion 5d. 
Under the authorU7 ot ilhe Reoonatruotlon Finance 
Corporation Aet ot 1932 aa aaencled1 whioh prodded UIOD8 other 
things that there might be onate4 oorpordiona to deal in 
atrateslo or oritioal materials or to take auOh other action 
ee the Preddent or the FedePal Loan Adm1niatrator might de .. 
neoeaaary to expedite the national deten .. Pl"'P'&IIIt the pre-
miUIII prioe plllD tunotioned tbrough the Metals Reaerve 0o111J1an7 
whioh 1s auoh a oorpora111on J;ro'Vided with tunda by Congreaa. 
The tunotioning ot 'be Natala Reaerve Co111peny in 
this respect will be developed ln detail in a later aeotlon. 
1. Tht Deteye Pl"'du!tlon Aot. !l! 1950, plua 
A1118ndlll8nt !! Julz !!!!1 
Publ1o Law 774 ot the Slat Congreaa app~ed Settem. 
bar 8 1 1980 "to eatabliah a .,.., .. ot priorities and allooa• 
tiona tor Jllaterlala and tacilitlea, authorise tba requla1t1on-
1ng thereof, pl"'V1de tinanolal aaaiatanoe for expanaion ot 
productive oapaoity and supply, proTide price and wage atabi· 
lisation, provide tor the aettle~~~ent of labor diaputea, 
strengthen controls over credit, aDd by these meaaures taci• 
litate production ot goode and ser.1oes necessa~ tor the 
national aeourity, and tor other purposes "provided in Title 
III tor Ezpaneion ot Produotive Capao1t7 and Supply. !his 
reads in Section 302r 
To expedite production and deli.aries, or services to 
aid in carrying out govermaent oontraots tor the pro-
curement ot materials or the pertol'Jilance ot eernoes 
tor the national defense, the President may make pro-
v1a1on tor loane (1:nolud1ng part1o1pat1on 1n, or 
guarantees of loans) to private business enterprises 
tor the expana1on ot capacity, the development of Tech• 
nolog1cal processes, or the prodUotion ot essential 
materials, 1nolud1q the exploration, developMnt, aDd 
mining of strategic and erit1oal metals and minerals. 
Such loans may be made Without regard to the l1m1tationa 
ot existing law and on auoh terma and conditions aa the 
President deema necessary, exoept that tlnancial ass1a• 
tanoe uy be extended only to the extent that 1 t 1a not 
otherwise available on reasonable terma. (The section 
was amended JUly 31, 1951 by Public Law 96, seotion 113c 
which read 1 ) 
It the President t1nds • 
(1) that under generally fair and equitable ceiling prioes 
tor any raw or non processed .. terial, there will reault 
a deGrease in supplies from higb-oost sources ot suoh 
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material, and that the tont1nuat1on ot auoh auppl1ea 
1a neoeasar;r to oarry out the ob.ject1ves of thll ActJ 
or (2) that an increase in coat ot transportation 1a 
temporary 1n character and threatens to impair maxi-
mum production or .apply 1n an;r area at stable prloea 
ot an;r materials 1 he may make prov1a1on tor aubdd7 
payments on an;r auoh domestioall7 pl'Oduoed material 
x x x x in auoh lUIIO\Ulta and 1n auoh manner and on auch 
terma and conditions ae he determines to be necessary 
to insure that auppliea trom -.h h1gb.-cost sources 
are continued, or that Nxh•am production or supply 
in auoh area.at stable prioaa ot auoh materials is 
maintained, as the oaae ..,. be. 
'l'ha De.tenae Minerals Oomp&nJ't a subaid1ar7 ot the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, has been dea1gnated aa 
the acency to handle the prov1a1oas ot th1a Act, and Ua op• 
erat1ona will be developed in a later section. 
V Some Theories ot Prise Controls and or Subsidies 
Before going into detail about the development, 
tuactionillg, and etteota ot the Premium Price Plan devised 
II 
to accomplish the purpoee ot \heae Acta, it aeema advisable 
to discuss some ot the theories ot tbe economics ot prioe con-
trols and auba1d!es. Partioularl7 does thla aeem appropriate 
at this point sinoe differential pricing and aubaidlea have 
juat been initiated and obvioual7 are to be expanded, 
Wars have alwaye induoed. price increases. DUring 
the War of 1812, the level of wholesale prices in the United 
States rose by about 70 per cent, during the Civil War period 
by slightly less than 120 per cent, and during the period 
affected by World War I by 125 per cent•* The magnitude or 
World War I, both in the inTolvement of the major nations of 
the entire globe a~d in the consumption of war materials, 
~rought the belligerent netiona face to face with problema 
of' demand, supply, production and inflation. These dwarfed 
the problema confronted in any other war and gave an impetua 
to governmental price control, re£Ulations and subsidies 
throu8hout the world. These attempts, their successes and 
their failures haTe been studied by economists, and theories 
of' the economics of war have been developed much farther. 
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The upward pressure on prices in wartime is due to 
the combined effect of two factorac {l) an increase in aggre• 
gate demand tor goods and (2) eliminat~on of supplies. The 
increase in aggregate demand comes moatly from increased 
demands or ,overnment for material& of war, although increased 
civilian demand usually accompanies the stimulation of employ-
ment due to war. The increase in aggregate demand would not 
raise the price level if the supply of goods could be expanded 
to the same degree, Not only is this balance difficult to 
accomplish but, even if plana are made for it, obstacles to 
expansion usuall7 arise in a war economy. Imports do not 
materialize} domestic output is curtailed while the war eoonoM7 
* '1, P• 14'1 
is toollng upJ pi'oduetlv1t7 JU.7 tall tbr e. ft'Wilbe:r ot reasoruaJ 
end adjustments in mobilisation ot industries cause work 
stoppages. Conseqaentl7• demand continues to exceed aupply 
and prices ere affected by this upwud preullZ'e. If this 
pressure continues, causing prioes to increase more than or 
at a faster rate than noraall7 prevails in a peacetime eco-
noJ17, inflation _,. be suarded against by some .to:rm ot price 
control in addition to other meaaurea. 
1.. PJ'loe OC)I!trol 
Any consideration ot·pr1oe oontrol meaaures must 
reoogniae that tha mann.r in wbioh prices are atteoted b7 
war differs greatly trom the etteot ot the normal tunot1on1ng 
ot prices in a peaoeUm.e HonOJ17• It 1a well understood that 
prices regulate output end oonauaption to a greater degree in 
peaoe time ~ in war U•• When ciYilian consumption, gen• 
erally war atiDnlated in spite of prioe increases, ia added 
to the pr1ury demanda ot material tor war purposes, the over-
all problea of aupply1ng both sesm-nta of the econo117 beoomes 
praoilioally impoaeible ot aoluUon. '!heretol'e, 1f price:} oon-
trol 1a to be imposed by the IO't'ernaent, it oal'lnot be relied 
upon aolely \o atimltlate output and to direct the uae ot 
materials needed tor oi't'ilian and wartime requirements. To 
accomplish these oomplioated tasks, the gove:rnment mmat aliO 
ha't'e authority to allocate or oontrol all materials for war 
and tor oi't'ilian requ1re~t•• Since it (the government) 
plana the out~t or war weapons, it 1a in the beat position 
to allocate vital mate~ial to~ the auccesstul conclusion ot 
the war and to designata how the .little remaining may be used 
for civilian needs. 
wThe price policy to be followed, being a fUnction 
ot gove~nment must, therefore, be tied in with the fiscal 
policies so that the required production or materials will 
materialise. Rigid prices are undesirable in that they may 
curtail production, create labor shortages or so squeeze pro• 
ducers as to cause a stoppage ot work essential to the war 
aims. Private producers cannot be expected to ope~ate sat1a-
tactor1ly when facing a financial loss due to a regulated 
price control program. 
"Relief measures under price ceilings, however, 
ar6 limited to a price rollback of the ove~all price or ot 
some of ita components, direct subaidation of domestic pro-
ducers or of impo~ted supplies, or of upward adjustment of 
ceiling prices.w• 
Pigou writes, wprima facie, authoritative limita-
tion of the price that may be charged ro~ a thing produced 
unde~ competitive conditions is likely to check the output 
ot that thing. Under these conditions, supplies could not 
in any event change more than the supply price or the quan-
tity sold, and therefore, limitation of price at the same 
time that it prevents the occurrence of abnormal profits, 
will cause output to be smaller than if prices were lett 
* 71 P• 148-158 
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tree. The reason• of course, ia that when tnere 1a a short-
ace or an7tbins, it 1a just: through the prospect of high 
prices and high profits that the shortage corrects itself. 
The prospect ot e~oept1oDal gains diverts tree resourcea 
into the induatry which is makins things 'llh!lt are sb:lrt. 
CUt ott this proapeot and the associated increase in supply 
will be checked. Any practical policy ot price control sat 
. take account o~ this fact•"* 
"A govermaent which haa deoided to oontrol tbe prioe 
ot a DUmber or important commodities, has to decide fUrther 
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how rar it would out them below the level that tree ooapeti• 
tion would bl'ins about toward the level that would yield the 
pra.war scale of profit; and 1n tormift8 thla decision, it haa 
to balance the evils or varioua a~~ounts ot pro1'1 teering against 
those of varioua degrees ot oheok to the supply or these oommo• 
dities."** 
"Whenever the question of price control arisea, 
thought must be g1 van to the lenl at whioh prices are to be 
trosan. It output or marginal produoers 1s needed• a deci-
sion has to be made as to how to haDdle their coat problem. 
Even in normal times, the use ot coats ot marginal producers 
tor price purposea 1a a rather arbitrary standard. zr, in a 
war economy the cost or marginal produoera 1a to be used as 
a base tor tixing a price, the tact must not be overlooked 
• a, P• 188 
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that coats ot marainal producers haYe a tenCleno:v to riae llllleh 
taster than the average coats of the in4uatr:v as a whole. 
Therefore, it prices are fixed aooord1ng to marginal producer 
costa, the well established t1rmwould receive an unearned in• 
or9111ent which would in no way work e.a an 1noent1 va ror baUer 
production."* 
Price re~lation in the United States, aa imposed b7 
the Office ot Price At'lmin1atrat1on, trhd txl meat thia problem 
by prescribing that "fair and equitable" maxillllllll prices ahall 
be established. The price administrator was also given the 
power to grant apeoit1o prioe ~tiona or direct aubaidf P87• 
menta. 
B. S!bs141ea 
The alternative to a tree price which stimulates 
production while allowing substantial prorita ia a low ceiling 
price plua a subaidfo SUch a aubaidy ma;v be given to the wbola 
output ot a producer or 1lo tl:lat part of it whioh 1a produced 
with greatest difficUlty. SUeh a suba1dy1 whc related to a 
fixed price, aiJU at preventing 11he fixed price trom oaua1ng 
• limitation or production. The important decision to be 11848 
in auch a oe.ae ia the t'ixins or the ceiling price and the de-
cision to consider ita revision 1r neceaaary. one leading 
economist aaya, "it 1a unreasonable to expect tb.at the general 
body of prices can be prevented in a long war troa rising to 
aome degree above their pra•ar laval x x x. Thua, the utmost 
* 8 1 P• 133 
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the government oan do is to restrict, it cannot hope to pre-
vent the upward movement 1n a DUmber of prices - movements, 
moreover, which are l1kel7 to bec011e more marked the longer 
the war lasts•"* 
"Beaidea the general financial doubts concerning 
aubaidiea, a badl7 needecl eoonoJdc precaution ahould be here 
underlined. The great danger ia that aubaidiea will pay tor 
inefficiency and oareleaaneaa while the more able, more etti• 
alent, and more oaretul. buaineas man will pay the aqueeae. 
But the rule 111111t be, it the leas etf1c1ent producers 11111st be 
used, that aa tar aa poaa1ble .uba1d1ea lhould only be given 
tor an ett1c1ent bualneaa 1n wh1oh a minimum pertormanoe per 
e-.plo7ed peraon 1a lllll1nta1ne4. That means 1n me.nutaoturing 
and mining induatriea that a 'ldnS.IIIIWil net output volume per 
em.ployed peraonr 4ur1Dg a week or 1110nth I!Dlat be ma1nta1ne4."** 
Subaidiea may take a nuaber ot torma. The "coat 
plua" aubeidy has drawbacks in that 1t 1a to the advantage ot 
the producer to get ooa.ta hieh• ':he "coat plua t1xe4 tee" 
abould encourage the produoer to work aa eoonom1oally as poa• 
aible. On the other band, wl»n a price level ia frozen at a 
apeoitic dete or period and an illlportant upward change ooaura 
in the coat level, aubs1dizins tn. aqueeze is usually UDder-
taken by government, at least 1n consumer g>oda, in order to 
maintain the price level. However, where there is overall 
* 6, P• 13-1 
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tixing of prices, wagea, intereat, rent, etc., these cost 
changes should be ot minor importance and may involve only 
transportation, which the State usually assumes. In other 
oases 1 subsidies are sometimes sranted only to detici t con-
cerns in the chain ot producer, wholesaler and retailer in 
order to maintain price levels. 
The theoriee outlined above should be IIIIU'ked well 
by the reader. Adherence to or deviation from them are tao-
tors to be considered in any apprdaing ot the Premium Price 
Plan adopted tor oopp.er. 
VI The Premium Price Plan tor Copper, Act ot 1942 
Ao p!velgp!!!!!t !! the Ul!! 
1. Basic Principles 
Early in 19411 Ottioe ot Price Administration otti• 
eials devoted increasing attention to the problem ot d1tter~ 
ential pricing tor the purpose ot increasing nonterroua metala 
out~t. On May 27, Donald Wallace and Carl Holmquist, who had 
been charged with the responsibility of traming a price polioy 
tor the metals, recommended to J. Kenneth Galbraith, head of 
the Price Division, that the problam of increasing copper pro-
duction, especially trom the smaller companies, could beat be 
mat by the otter ot a "subsidy on uniform terma to the entire 
industry for any inoreaae in produotion over the rate of the 
tirat five months of 194lo" This reoommendation received 
Galbraith's approval at onoe, and that ot Henderson 1n JUne 
atter Wallace pointed out the vaeney or the aupply situation 
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with respect to copper and indicated "that an additional 
prod~ction of somewhere between so,ooo and 1001 000 tons 
might be secured from high.coat domestic copper if a higher 
price is paid for this additional supply•" Wallace divulged 
that his staff was Wworkins out a scheme whereby this addi-
tional production oan be secured at a higher price without 
raising the price above 12 cents or less." Thus the idea 
of a premium price plan waa developed as early as the Spring 
of 1941•* 
soon after this, the Labor Production Division of 
the Office of Production Management came to similar conclu-
sions relative to differential pricing for the non ferrous 
metals and officials of that division assisted greatly in 
working out the details of sueh a plan and in gaining its 
acceptance. 
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The basic principle of the Premium Price Plan was 
the payment by premiums for all production over a quota whioh 
was to be based on 1941 production. This premium was to be 
paid on over quota production of an individual mine or groups 
of mines, individually owned, and proper safeguards were set 
up to take care of>underproduction at any one mine of a group. 
2. Preaentation ,!!! Premium Price f.!!!! ,1;.2 ~ Industry 
suggestions with respect to the desirability and 
necessity of some type of two-price system were presented to 
the copper industry and discussed with them. In a speeoh 
delivered before tbe American Mining Congress on September 
301 1941, John Hsmm, Deputy Administrator of OPA pointed out 
very clearly thO differenoee between the bulk-line system ot 
pricing in the Firat War and the ay•tem applied in this war. 
In this connection he aaida 
"We have given much tilll8 to the problem of procur• 
ing the output of higb-coat producers. But in establiahing 
generally applicable ceiling prices we have concentrated our 
attention on the low-and-intermediate rather tb&n the high• 
coat producers. In order to get tbe relatively amall amount 
or high-coat output we favor a multiple or differential price 
ayatem rather _than a uniform bulk•line price•"* 
Mr. Ha111111 pointed out that the chief problema asso• 
ciated with the development of a multiple-price system in-
volved (l) the maintenance ot current high-coat production, 
and (2) the stimulation of additional production through in-
tensive uae of existing facilities and development of new 
facilities. He referred to the Michigan aituation aa an 
example of the kind of arrangemants that could be made to 
maintain current high-coat production and he auggeated that 
e11111lar techniques could be uaed to stimulate added produc-
tion from existing facilities. ae continued: 
"As demand tor metals inereases we are naturally 
interested in seeing that idle facilities are brought back 
into use, that oper~t1ng mines step up tbeir rate of produe-
* 18, ,. '18 
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tion and ~t new mlnea are opana4. The price p:roblem here 
is in man7 wa7s dmilar to tho prob1• of llldnbining mars!• 
nal produot1on. 'fe reoepiso that someth1na onr the oeiling 
prioe is required to aoco~1ieh tho objective. We reel that 
the inoroased oost ot the additional produotion should be met 
diroctl7 b7 the detenee ageaoios ot government. We are oon-
tident that satiataotor7 al'l'angoments oan be made and we 
shall be ~d to asaiat in the nosotiation of saoh oontraota 
between the go~ernment and tho .tning industl'7••• 
Hamm also indioated that attention would be given 
to adapting suoh arranaementa tor developing new facilities 
and proapooting tor new oro. 
The reaot1on of the industl'7 to thea• proposals 
was mixed. On the one band• IIUoh a lllllltiplo-prioe arrange-
meat waa oontra1'7 to eatabliahed prioe praotioes and jeopar-
dised tho windfall profits that WOUld ace~• in a a1nglo-prioe 
s78tem to tho lew-oost miaes. On the other hand, it waa felt 
that suoh an al'l'angoment would have a nab111B1ng etteot on 
wages in tboae oaaea wbere sliding•soale oontraota e.ziated 
between the oomPaD7 and the union and that it waa difficult 
to fo~late an alternative whioh would at the aame time in-
crease p:roduotion and maintain prioo stability. 
3. Pinal D1souaaione Prior l! Aoooptanoo 
several .. nthe botoro Pearl Harbor, OPA ott1oiala 
had developed the Preld.ua Pl'1oo Plan to the poirlt where it 
waa read7 tor detailed and final discussion with the Ottioo 
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of Production Management and the Metals Reserve Corporation. 
After Pearl Harbor, increased production of all metals be-
came even more urgent, a.nd there developed increasing support; 
for a differential pricing syetem in copper, lead, and aino. 
A ropresenta.t1ve of the Inter!Uit1onal Union of Mine, Mill, 
e.nd smelter Workers urged the adoption of such a plan in 
testimony before the Truman committee, and there was renewed 
support trom the Labor Production DiVision of OPM. The Com-
modity Division of OPM• ho~ver, were at first reluctant to 
support the adoption ot euah a plan, believing that a flat 
increase in prices would be more ettective in securing addi-
tional production. In spite of this, the plan was agreed 
upon and made effective January 121 1942. 
4. .!!!!. Or1dnal Plan 
On January 12, 1942, the Metals Reserve Company 
announced that it would pay premiums tor all over quota pro-
duction of copper at s premium ot 5 cents a pound until Aug. 
ust 1, 1944. To differentiate between large and small mines, 
five different classes of quotas were set up: 
(a) Zero quotas, to be assigned to properties 
6'F 
which produced aoo ·tons ot metal or less during 1941. All 
production trom zero-quota mines would receive premium prices. 
(b) Intermediate quotas between zero and 100 per 
cent, to be assigned to properties which produced more than 
aoot but leu than 600 tons or metal in 1941. These mine• 
were to haYe a quota arrived at by deducting 200 tons trom 
their 1941 production, multiplying the remR1nder by 1 1/8 
and dividing by 12. tor the monthly figure. The quote would 
thus be less then the.actual 1941 production. 
(c) one hundred per cent quotes, to be aasigned 
with certain exceptions to all mines which produced 600 tona 
or more or metal in 1941. The 1941 production was to be ad• 
justed to what it would have been had. the mlne operated on a 
52·week baais, so th11t in l!l01:ualit)- 1'118Dy of the mlnee in thla 
class would receive ~otas larg~ then their 1941 output. 
(d) Specil!ll quotu leu than 100 per cent ot the 
1941 monthly rate or prcduot1on might be udgned undeP ap ... 
cial oircumatanoea. 
(e) Special quotas in ezcess or 100 per oent we:Pe 
authorized also whe:Pe the committee had reason to believe 
that A rate of production greater than. that during 1941 could 
be profitably maintained at the ceiling prioe•* 
A quota committee was to set the quota tor each 
mine based on the ma:d11111m produo tion the t might reesonebly 
he.ve been expected during 1941 with existing f'M111t1ee and 
labor had these been used to tull capacity. Special induce-
ments were to be offered to ama.l1 mines and might nlso be 
offered at the diaoretion of the committee to other minea as 
well. In this respect, the:Pe was no real aafeguerd egaiut 
overgeneroaity. Quotas once established could not be raised 
during the lite or the plan and the tendency wns to fix thea 
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high rather than low, since a downwP.J:Od adjustment oould be 
me.de 11' inequities developed, end becs.uee those assigning 
quotas were primerily concerned with stepping up produotion. 
s. Formal orggnisstion 
The Premium P1'1ee Plan aeflue.lly went into operation 
lnte in February 1942 with payments made retroactive to Feb-
ruary 1, 1942 end with e 111'e orig1ndly or two am one-halt 
years or until ~ugust 1, 1944. ~ May, its operation had 
become fdrly well organized with a tacit division or authOr-
ity between the agencies concerned. 
The legal authority ror the tu.nctioning or the plan 
stems from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act or 19321 
amended. '!'his provided that corporations might be created to 
deal in strategic and critical materials which the President 
and Federal Loan Administrator .felt were necessary .for the 
derenae program. Metals ResePVe QOJliPilDY was such a corpora-
tion and with funds, voted it by Congress, it t1nanoed thll 
plan. In the beginning, the Federal Loan Administrator dele• 
gated authority tor fixing quobs to the War Production :Board 
and Office of Price Administration, subject to approval ot 
the Meta.ls Reserve Company wbich also ectad AS disbursing 
agent. Under this delegation, une Director ot Industrial 
Materials Price Division or OPA, the Vice Chairman tor Metals 
and ~inerals of the WPB, and a Vioe President or Metala Re-
serve Company became reviewing ortioera, t.ll but the conti'O• 
veraial oaaea are aoreened by aasia\anta properly authorised 
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by tbeae men•* 
Any of these three reviewing offieers could return 
a recommendation be d1aapproved1 to the Quota Committee, gen-
erally with a letter of explanation and suggested changes. 
Usually it was found• the OPA offioer disapproved on finan• 
oial and excessive earnings grounds, the WPB officer on tbe 
grounds that production misnt be restricted by too close prto. 
ing, while the Metals Reserve Company officer found that the 
recommendation was for diaburaement for purposes not conte~ 
plated by this company. 
e. I!!! Qt+ota 0011111!1 the 
The QUota Committee was the main administrative body 
and was compoaed of seven mining engineers, three from WPB, 
three from OPA and a non-voting chairman appointed by WPB. 
This group was a technical advisory body to the reviewing 
officers and had no powers to authorize affirmative actions. 
It could only make recommendations to the reviewing offioera. 
However, b7 ret'uaing to recommend, it did take negative action 
and continuall7 notified applicants of its stand. Trds co~ 
mittee had two advisors, a legal advisor from OPA and a labor 
advisor from the Ma.npower Requirements Office of Wl'B• The 
legal advisor signed all recommendations. The labor advisor 
advised the committee on problema involving the proper use ot 
labor in war production and commented generally on the tinan-
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oial aspeots ot ooaaittee reeommendations. He approved or 
disapproved each reoommeadation trom the viewpoint ot the 
eeonomieal use ot labor. His disapproval bore weight, tor 
in suoh oasea, reconsideration was required b~ the Committee.• 
7. Metals Reserve Comeanr Pg!Otlebs 
PrelliWII pa711Bnta to prOduers were 111ade and all 
tisoal details handled by the Metals Reserve Compan~. The 
tunotioning and superv1a1on ot ita operations waa oonduoted 
b~ a small statt 1n Waah1ns'on an4 b7 agents looated throuSh• 
out the United States. 
The outr1pt aubai~ arrangement ot the PremiWII 
Price Plan made 1 t unneoeaaar~ tG'l' th1a oompan~ to acquire 
title to the IIMttals entitled to premiuma. Certain 811181Ung 
and milling companies were appointed agents ot the Metals Re• 
serve Coapany and were guided by 1nat~ot1ona turni~ed thea. 
The aaelt1ng and milling companies selected as agents were 
well known units 1n the oounf;J7 and received no ooapenaat1on 
tor these particular aervio .. but included thia servioe as 
part ot their smelting onarses. Premium copper ore and oon-
oentrates were reoeived direct from prodDoera at the various 
plants ot these asents tor prooeaaing. 
Preaiuaa were paid on a monthly baaia. The amount 
payable waa determined by the amount ot over quota production 
reeeived dur1ns a given month by the mill or smelter to whioh 
the produoer delivered h1a produetion, as determined by the 
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Metala Reae~ve OompaDJ'• prooedurea. The p~oduoe~ waa ~e­
qu1red to eatabliah hia eligibilit7 to~ p~eaiua p~nta and, 
attar anal;raia ot hia quota aaaisaaeut and the aaount eligible 
to~ preaiuma, hie overquotla prod.uation waa oerUf1ed and pre-
mum pa119nta on itl were requeatled trom the oompaJ17 actina aa 
agent. The produoera atfidavita involved were oleared by the 
agent and transmitted to Waahta&ton tor review and tinal 
approval. Afte~ approval, the agent, acting on hie authorit7 
tl'om the Metals Reserve Oompan71 paid the amount of premiums 
by eheok ~awn on tunda auppl1ed b7 Metala Reaerve Compan:r• 
Th1a payment prooedmre waa followed in all ••••• 
involving quotaa, other than aero quotaa, and proved generall7 
aat1afaotor;r. 'l'o be ot aadatanoe to amall ainera, who 1n 
ma117 oaaea relied prineipall7 on premiums to maintain their 
operationa, a prooedure waa deviaed Auguat 1, 1943 b7 whioh 
advanoe paymenta ot 90 per cent ot the eatimated tote.l pre. 
m1uma pe:rable on aero quota procmotion were made. '1'he agent, 
acting tor ita own individual aooeunt, paid the producer on 
the apot, after 1denUt1oaUon ot hi a ownerahS.p of the ahip. 
ment and of hi a aero quota aaa1sn Mnt. The agent waa r•S.-
buraed by Metala Reae~v• 0011tpan7 tor all lots ao handled. 
Agenta of the Metala Reaerve Compan:r examined at 
reJUlar 1Dtarvala the booka of the agenta and where neoeaaar:r 
made ehangea 1n prooedure and aeoured adjuatlmenta on overpaid 
aeooUDta. In addition, Metala Raaerve Company arranged tor 
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independent weighing, sampling, and assaying of the prodUC• 
tion of mines owned and operated by smelting or milling com-
panies acting as agents. This service met with the approval 
ot all parties and the benefits of it were amply demonstrated. 
a. Administration and Other problems 
Originally, the plan contemplated a full labor sup. 
ply and that managemant would be limited in the production ot 
lower grade ores only by prices or bottlenecks in facilities. 
QUotas were determined upon 1941 experience and were designed 
to provide maximum production obtainable with aut ott grades 
at ceiling prices. Premiums were to be paid on any produc-
tion over quota, and it was felt that premiums would allow 
lowering of cut ott gradee and the stimulation of greater pro-
duction of ores, which could not be mined profitably at ceil• 
ing prices. 
(a) Prom the viewpoint of increased production, the 
plan worked in the expected fashion tor most of the industry 
for a few 1110nths only and tor a cUmin18hing portion of the 
industry for most of its life•• The original assumption that 
an adequate labor supply would be available did not prove to 
be so. Consequently, due to labor ahorta.ges which a.ffected 
production and increased costa, the plan tended toward a 
system under which subsidies were paid not only for expansion 
of production but also for maintenance of production in the 
face of risins costa. This was done under the quota number 4 
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provision for oo~ideration of speoial oases. These special 
oases aoon became tb& rule rather than the exception, and the 
~ota Committee deYOted almost its entire time to revision of 
quotas. The Ohansin8 conditions atfeoted the basic premise 
of the plan, wbioh was calculation of the maximum possible 
production, and resulted in calculation of the production 
which might be obtained with the pven labor supply, what it 
would coat, and what quotas would yield auttioient revenues 
to cover all minins oosts and maintain an adequate margin ot 
protito As time passed, these new objectives of the plan to 
cover ooats under all conditions, were retleoted in auoh 
changes in its structure as to undartake to revise quotas 
downward to compensate tor wage increases, to increase pre-
miums, to finance develo~nt campa1~, and to provide tor 
amortisation ot capital inVeetment. 
(b) Prom the viewpoint of the industry branches of 
the War Production Boar4, the whole quota committee procedure 
was largely a waete of tiu. Thall' poe1t1on was summarised 
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by George a. Helkaa, 1n his repo:Pt tor the week ending JUly 11, 
l942t 
"The effort to keep profits as low as possible, and 
prohibit the earning ot extra money neoeseary tor exploration 
and development of new ore bodies to replace those that have 
been exhausted 1a detrimental to the production program. !be 
premise on whioh the borw.s plan was originally founded, to 
pay a bonus tor production in exoeas ot that prodUced in 1941, 
.,. 
haa been forsotten. We are 1n a war and we need more produc-
tion of critical metala, The object of the higner pricea for 
mebl 1a to enable the mining of lower grade ore. If large 
profita were made, wb1oh la practically impossible, they 
would be taken over by Federal and State taxes, Moat or thia 
quota committee work ia a Pank waste or time ot valuable en-
gineers.• He then went on to OOIIlPla1n that too muon. streea 
was being given to the development or very small propePtles, 
using labor and material that ~lbt be more productively used 
in large mines, 
Even more expllolt was So Ho Ball, who examined the 
whole premium price structure at the behest of Ho w, Dodge, 
Deputy Director of the War Produotlon Board, 
"!beae prices," he wrote, "were expected to meet 
possible inoreued costa of production and to foster the mia.. 
ing or marginal orea not profitable at current prices. Labor, 
however, appears to take lbe att1111lde that it arll.'l not either 
capital or the war effort was to be the oh1et beneficiary or 
the plan."* 
He arped that beeauae qllotaa were baaed on 19411 
when the major companies were producing at capacity, thoae 
tor the large m1nea were put ao hllb that tibeT derived little 
beneti t trom the premium pr1oea • Output from large minea, 
the major source ot ore, had not been appreciably 
raiaed. Ball thought the oommi ttee composed of •unusually 
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capable .. n," but hiiPered th1a ju4pent with the OOI!llll8nt 
that - •ao tar aa the larser OOIIP&nlea are concerned, certain 
melllbera seem to dealre to re110Ye all traces of' the protit 
Be proposed an inoreaae 1n the base price of' the 
metals .uttioient to balance all was• inoreaaea ainoe the 
atar11 ot the war, 
(o) From 11he 1'1ewpolnt et the OPA lllltlllbera, the 
pri111&17 oonoern waa with 'Wld1a1nutbe4 mdntenanoe of' the prioe 
oeil1nga on 11he bulk of' metal pH<IUOtton. 'l'hia would only be 
aooompl1ahed it the prem1Uil Pa,...nta actually brought ou11 the 
desired quant1t7 of' marslnal ore. The7 objeoted that the oo~ 
1111 ttee had no pol1o7 w1 th rea})41ofi to treatn•nt of' new Yen• 
turea or to the extent that Uleo• taxes ahould be considered 
in caloulat1ng opera111ns marsinaJ that there waa no resul.ar 
proo~re tor oouiderins applioa111ona, aDd that no ae11 of' 
f'ol"'U exiahd tor el1o1111ng .. lntormatllon needed, 'l'h07 alao 
oonteDded that the WPB IIIOIIlbera had too llall7 other reapona1b1• 
l1tiea and 11bat the aetual analya1a of' problema waa made 
either b7 the OPA repreaentatiYea or by the ad'Yiser trom the 
WPB Labor D1Y1a1on. The7 wu.ted a atandard f'oa tor oolleot-
ins 1ntormat1on trom mine operators, a f'ors.liaed procedure 
tor oona1der1ns appl1oat1ona 1 a d1Y1a1on of' labor on the work 
ot anal7a1a, aDd aboYe all, a olean-out asreement on poliOY•** 
'76 
'l'he fwl48ll8ntal d1Yergenoe of viewa within the 
Committee waa lett unreoono11ed, though atepa were taken to 
1mproye procedure. A new tuJ.l-tiliMt exeout1Ye aeOl'fl,tiry. 
Landon F'. Strobel, had joine4 the atatt of the Committee 
late in June, and processes were being rationalised eYen 
though policy re~~~a1ned in diapute • Ul'lder prodding trom the 
OPA :members, two bade reporting torma were adopted. The 
tirat ot these proT1ded a standard pattern tcr submitting 
operating co1t d.ata, pro4uot1on d.ata, and toreoaet ot opera-
tiona. It waa ready by the middle ot September 19421 and a 
oo~arable term ooYer1ng the tr1•8tate concentrates ••• read7 
a month bter. A Metal Mining Analyail Ottice had meanwhile 
been aet up in OPA early 1n JUDe, where a group ot engineer• 
undertook to evaluate the data au~tted. by mine operators. 
To thia ottice went the torma returned with quota appl10a• 
tiona, and aeon a more or leaa formalised analya1a ot eaoh 
mine property seeking a quota or quota reviaion beoame part 
ot the regular procedure. 
(d) Prom the viewpoint ot the War Manpower Oommia• 
aion, the pro.,ilion ot the 11apeo1al" premium tor copper raiae4 
many oontlioting ideas aa to the uae or manpower. 'l'he Quota 
Committee waa apeo1t1ollly limited by the last paragraph of 
the Clayton (Vioe ireaident ot Metals Reserve Company) letter 
ot December 13, 19421 which enjoined tl'lt t "moat caretul conai• 
deration" be g1Yen to the qaeat1on ot manpower and supply, 
aDd laid down the general PUle that t.t» inoree.aed prodtl ot1on 
arising UDder the additional prea!um must justifY the expen-
d! ture in ~~~anpower. 
The wo:rd1ng ot tl» Cla7ton letter was vague, o.nd 
the members of the ~ota Committee were soon at odds with 
the labor adv1eer and among theuelvea u to how it lhoulc1 
be applied. The WPB membna inollned to the podtion that 
the Oolll!l11ttee•s tunotion was to ... ke reoo!llllllnde.tions for quota 
revisions baaed on eng1neer1Jlc and operating data, that the 
OPA should confine itself to price considerations, and that 
11: was up to the War Manpower Colllll1aa1on to 1nllllre a sutfi-
eient auppl7 of labor to meet m111t.ry and essential civilian 
requirement• f.or the metal 1n queat1on. 
The Labor Production D1T1a1on ot WPB, whose repre· 
aentative aat with the Quota Committee, took a very different 
attitude. Ita position was that, the supply of mine workers 
being Umited, lhJlpower should be used where it would do the 
moat good. Three general pr1nciplea were auggeatedt (1) The 
manpower which is available tor mining activities makes the 
greatest contribution to prodKction tor the war effort it it 
ia employed - u between metlals, at thoae propertiea which 
produoe the moat essential ores. (The periodic releaaes of 
the Conaervation Division of the WPB which give tbe list of 
critical metals and their relative eaaentiality, ahould serve 
aa a guide in applying tbia principle.) - As between mines 
producing the same metals, at those properties which have 
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the highest productivity of metal per man employedJ (2) 
Detailed information on the labor situation at the particu-
lar property requesting a quota revision and on the situa-
tion in the labor-market area where the property 1a located 
:!.a an enenti•l requirement tor appropriate considerAtion ot 
quota rev1sionsJ (3) The denial ot a request tor quota revi-
a1on on the be.ah ot manpower"conaiderat1ons should be sub-
ject to reconsideration it appreciable changes occur in the 
manpower 1itua.tion. 
Current data on employment and production were 
available monthly, end trom theae data the Labor Production 
Divilion (WPB) prepared detailed tables showing labor produc-
tivity by mines. These tables were offered ea a guide in 
reviewing requests for quota revisions. 
The contliet continued without solution and was 
finally referred to Chairman ot the War Manpower Commission 
Paul v. McNutt on May 21 1 1943. Before he replied on June 10, 
the first monthly Ninerals Classification List, prepared by 
the Mineral Resources Co-ordinating DiVision of Ule Wer Pro-
duction Board in co-operation with the Labor Production Divi-
sion, had been distributed, ud the WMO Chairman baaed his 
opinion on it. The list divided mines into tour cleaaea in 
terms of their essentiality in the war program. Workers in 
Olaaa I and II mines were to be beld in their jobs aa tar as 
possible, but labor from Ollila III lllines would be granted 
certificates ot separation \o move to a higher olaaa, while 
active recruiting among Claaa IV mine workers was to be en-
couraged in the interest of mines in the first two groups. 
·lie wrote, "I tully agPee that the production of non. 
ferrous metals is a matter of utmost urgency, and you can be 
assured that the War Manpower Commission will continue to 
take all possible steps toward staffing the mines. It is ot 
utmost importance, however, that until manpower is available 
to meet all the needs, we make the tullest possible use of the 
labor we have so as to insure a continued and increasing flow 
ot critical metals. It is in the beat interests of the war 
effort that those mines which are most productive of the metals 
most critically needed be given priority in tne referral of 
whatever labor supply becomes available. 
"Although we cannot und~take to assure priority in 
referral of labor to mines in Class III until the total supply 
of labor available in metal mining is increased, we do not 
believe that high-cost mines prOducing critically needed metals 
should be shut down merely because their production is low. 
we recognize that all possible resources must be exploited to 
increase the supply of suCh metals as copper, of which the 
supplies are insufficient for war demands and essential civi-
lian demands. we do believe, on the other hand, that mines 
producing primarily metals such as antimony and lead (which are 
classified by the War Production Board, Conservation Division, 
as available in quantities sufficient to permit their use as 
substitutes for scarcer metals) should be considered a source 
ot systematic recruitment to provide labor tor mining orit1• 
Cally needed metals. In oonsiderins the status or auab Nines, 
we belien that tbe War PJ>odu.otion Board lhould take copi-
sance or the total manpower emplo,-4 relative to the produc-
tion or the oJ>itioal metals alone. We have called to the 
attention ot Mr. Howal"d Young a nwaber or nch cues which 
we believe should be included in Class IV ot the Minerals 
Classification List supplies by him, thereby permitting the 
War Manpower Commission to l'eoruit a.ong the emplo,-ees of 
such mines and to retel' to oritioal mines such workers as 
are w1llinR to tranatel'ow* 
Mr. Mclfu.tt wu obviously reluctant to commit hi ... 
self on what wu, after all, a matter for WPB and OPA to 
decide, and before the aubjeot could pursue the issue fUrther 
he ceased to have jnr1ad1otiono He was replaced as Operat1ona 
Vice Chairman by Hiland G. Batebeller on July 1, 1943. Tbe 
manpower ehcrte.ge in non rel'rous ldnlng meanwhile was growing 
wol'Be month by month, aJid no tiu we.a lost in stating th.e OP.A 
poaition to the new Operations Vioe Ohdl'man. In a memoran-
dum or JUly 1 1 1t was ergu.ed that it wu WBstet'ul to continue 
subsidies to properties where labOl' shortages made 1t impol-
sible to keep up pro~otion. 
"Money subsidies," Batobeller concluded,"will not 
place m.en in the lld.nea, and the continued increase ot suoh 
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subsidies due to lowered prodUction merely tends to conceal 
the true problem a.nd to aggravate inflationary trends whioh 
we can no longer afford•"* 
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Later Mro Batcheller set up a special staff attaohe4 
to his office to review ~power considerations in connection 
with quota revisions. By this step, for the first time, the 
Quota Committee's actual military and civilian requirements 
for copper were weighed against Uhe blanket expansion policy 
pursued to date. 
g. Decline ja production 
Early in 19421 in apite of the Premium Price Plan 
and its beneficial effect upon wages, labor began to leave the 
Western minea tor the ah1pyards ~d airplane factories. By 
summer, the situation was serious and shortly it became oriti-
calo Housing shortages, difficult transportation, the draft-
ing of miners tor the armed tOl'oes, and delays in meeting the 
wage problem added to the seasonal ah1tt away from the minea 
and brougllt about an aotual decline in output in spite ot 
premium payments tor production. 
wages 1n metal mining averaged ~37.28 a week, and 
in the smelting and refining of copper, lead and zinc only 
t35.18, while the competing industries, aircraft mauuracture 
and shipbuilding plid $45.94 and $5:5•30 respectively •. Thirty 
seven wage cases involving non rerrous metal miners were 
berore the National War Labor Board b;r the summer or 1942• 
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an4 it waa olear the'll unpower r4tqlliremen11s ooulll be met 
only by increasing wages. Yet even at tho existing wage 
so ales l118.11Y 1111ne opera tOll' 1 had found tho premium pa7111ents 
inadequate incentive tor tapping low-grade or••• Metal re-
quirements tor tbe llZ'lRed services aeanwh1le oontinued to 
expand, and a substantial increase in doaest1o production 
seamed essential. 
10. §p!oi!l Q!!.otae .!.!'!! Pl'elliUJ!U! 
Declining pro4uet1on waa so serious tba'll 1t could 
no.t be permitted to continue. In rlew ot the tight labor 
situation and its contribution to deol1n1ng prodUction, the 
question or inoreasiaa premium prices was seriously considered 
in the Fall of 1942• Man, plans were developed which called 
tor yery liberal expansion ot prealuma but all were rejected• 
The tinal plan was approved Zan. e, 1943 with an etteotive 
date of the first ot tho ;roar. An additional premium tor 
copper was not provided •tna..uoh as the a~~ounts or this metal 
which may need still higher pri••• are likely to be quito 
small. Any majol' oaae 1n wllf.oh the highest establllhed pre• 
Ilium pl'ico tor ooppol' does not provide adequate revenue to 
enable needed production oan be taken up with the Metals Re-
serve Company b7 the appropriate industry branch or WPB. By 
this action, it is not oontoaplated that Metals Reserve Com-
pany will be asked to ~~ako apooial arrsngementa with any largo 
DUmber or mines. We oona14er thet not an unreasonable ooat ot 
this program over and above the ooet ot the premlulll priee pro ... 
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gtoam 111ay amount to three llllll1on dollars a year."* 
This proved to be a V.P7 inaccurate estimate ot 
the aitu~ttion tor ~e nulllber ot J'ecpleata tor a special pre-
mium exceeded by tar anyth1q eont•plabdo The m1nea tloo4• 
ing the WPB with a~pl1cationa were generally small, marginal, 
and with widely varying eosta. Flnally arranged was 111. spe-
cial cp10ta, baaed on the partloular o1roumatancea ot eaoh 
eligible mine, with a pr81111wa at an unapec1t1ed n.xed l'ate 
to be paid tOl' production in excess of ~1• apeoial quota, 
in addition to the A pr8111wa· already 1n etteot. The apeo1al 
quote wu l1nd11ed to mines produeing leas than 2000 tons ot 
copper during 1942 aDd was subject to 1ncreaae at any Uae 
or revoeation in 30 days. This plan was made etteetive May 
1, ~943. 
11. QuOta Revisione !! Ohangtn& Metal Requil'emanta 
When the Pl'eaiua Price Plen was tirat put into 
etteot in Februal'Y 1942, eatillatea ot l'equbementa wel'e ao 
indefinite that the Quota Oollllll111tee aimed at "maxilllWD poa-
aible output"• Aa the war took a more favorable tvn toward 
the end ot 19421 more preelae forecasts became posa1bleo 
Foreign aouroea or supply were not out orr, as had bean 
teared, and the rste ot loaa 11hrough ship ainkinga was con-
siderably lower than Ubat allowed tor. 
The wbele minerals picture waa clarified, ao tar 
aa the war Production Board was eoneerned, by the establish-
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ment aa of Januar;r 301 19431 ot the Mineral& Reeouroea Co• 
ord1nating Div1aiont the I!.S.neala and Metals .~tdviaory Com-
mittee, and the linerala Reaouroea Operating Committee, wUb 
Boward I. Young, Director ot the Mlaerala BUreau, ae eft••· 
tive bead of all three units. The Mineral& and Metals ftd· 
vie01'7 Committee waa 1n an exeeptional poeition tor evalua-
ting actual needs 1n the IUtala field beoauae it repreeented 
the War and Nav7 Departments, the Board of Economic Warfare, 
and interested d1vi81ona ot the Department ot Commerce an4 
Interior ae well as unite of WPB concerned with suppl;r an4 
requirementa. ,-
At the same time, preaaure troa the senate'• Spe-
cial Comm1 ttee to Study the Problema of American Small Bud ... 
neas, under the cha1rmanah1p ot senator !IU.rra;r, tended to 
force a olear atatement ot polic7 with respect to the expan-
sion of mineral production troa the War Production Board. 
Doneld Nelson testified on April l before a sUb-committee on 
miD.erala and lllltala and h1a vine were amplified 1n a letter 
to the Prle14ent dated April 17. Fl'om the point ot view of 
the Quota Committee the moat important policy atatement cOD.• 
ta.ined in the letter was tbat in regard to small an4 margil'UI.l 
mines, which readl 
"It 1a national pol107 to make the fullest poaaible 
uae of small and marginal ore 4epoa1te, subject to theae 11m1• 
tationsa (l) The' the ezpeoted re11urn in usable llllnerala 1a 
autt1cient to justify the uae ot eritical aaterS.ala an4 equip. 
ment in present operation or expansionJ (2) that \he retuPn 
in usable minerals ie sufficient to justify the use of man-
power1 not only in operation ot the mine, but also in the 
construction or aoceaa roads and similar facilitative con-
struction; (3) alae that the uae ot resources will not actu-
ally interfere with the 'mu.st• progl'ama• "* 
Before it oould be ooooluded Whether the retum 1n 
usable minerals would juatity the expenditure of equipment 
and manpower in any given case, it would be necessary to know 
just how much or the given metal was needed and what were the 
possibilities tor getting it in the desired quantity aa be-
tween foreign aouroea and 4omeatio sources and as between 
different domestic mines. The overall requirements and the 
supplies available through importation were known to the in-
dustry branches of WPB, and presumably to their repreaenta• 
tives on the ~ota Committee, but these figures were not made 
the common property or the Committee. They were not used as 
a gauge to determine how far production should be stepped up, 
a a the indi viduala conoerned preferred to err on the aide of 
safety and, consistent with the policy of WPB'a Chairman, to 
seek too much rather than too little. 
The information necessary tor weighing the poeaibi-
litiea as between mines, was avaUable to all or the mellilers 
ot the Committee in the torm or the labor productivity tables 
prepared by the Office ot Manpower Requirements and the Minerals 
* 18, P• 63 
Claasitication Liata of the Mineral Reaources Co-ordinatins 
Division. It only remained to revalue the whole premium 
price program in the light ot sotusl requirements figures. 
That the whole metala picture was improving there could be 
little doubt. On August 10, the War Production Board re-
viewed the stock-piling program and agreed that stock piles 
should be held to approximately one year's reserve plus pipe 
line. At about the same time the Production Executive Com-
mittee l.aid down the dictum that when a sate stock pile ot 
any metal had been built up, t'urther importation and produc-
tion would be brougnt into balance with consumption. 
Early in November, 1943, the copper situation waa 
reviewed by the Minerals end Metals !dvisory Committee whieh 
had indicated a downward reviaion ot the military require-
ments. On November 9, the War Prodllc tion Board circular -6563 
announced that applications tor special copper premiuma under 
the MHy 1 program would not be acaepted atter December 311 
1943. 
12. Exteneion .2,! Du.ratiog !! ~ Plan 
The decline in production in 1942, the provision 
for increased premiums, and the continued revision of quotas 
downward were all pert of the progrlllll designed to overaome 
the serious metal shortages which were continuing. Added to 
these provisions tor stimulating production, as well as matn-
ta1ning it on very marginal properties, was an extension ot 
the lite ot the Plan for one 1110re year or to JUly 31, 19-65. 
87 
In 111111 e:d1enaion there wae an added prortdon that the 
quota• on Wbioh the additional prea!ume were baaed ooald be 
inoreaaed or revoked at any ti .. on thirty daya' notice. In 
addition, it waa provided \hat the Metala Reaerve Company 
would not make any aettlemant with pro~oera baeed on addi-
tional premium. in the ennt or tfl'lllination or the prelld.um 
price pro~am prior to JUly 311 1941•* Theae proviaiona 
roae to plague ottioiala in chal"p ot the program aa Congre11 
later attacked them with vigor •• being untair to produoera. 
In faot, th1a e1tuat1on played an important part in the COD• 
greaaional hearings involved in .ubeequent extenaiona or the 
plan. 
Later, Ooagreaa 1 b7 law 81021 extended the Premium 
Price Plan to JUne 301 l94fi. In JulJ 1946, it wae extel'lded 
asa1n by Public Law 5481 19th Ooagreaa to JUne 301 1947. In 
1947, Congreaa paaaed the Allen Bill tor continuation ot the 
plan but it waa vetoed by P:reatdent 'l'rum•an• 
VII Produo\loa !! Coppe:r Ul'l4er !!!,! Prelld.um Price Plan 
When it became apparent that do1111at1c production 
would be inadequate for all military and civilian require-
menta, aome atepa were taken to inewre more adequate suppliee 
before the Premium Price Plan waa initiated. Latin-Amarioan 
tiDd other foreign purohaaea have been mant1one4. By May, 
1942, a few monthl after the beginning of the plan, it waa 
reported that the Metal• Reeerve Company had purohaaed 
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'eo,ooo toaa or oopper from SoU\h Aaerioa aloae and that 
additional supplies were en route from lew Zealand, Aua-
tralia, and Atrioa. Arrsnsementa were alao aade to aoquire 
metal belonging to hsnoe and otur countries to whom it 
oould not be delivered due to shipping diffioultiea. 
Having an important beariag upon domeatio aupplles 
waa inatltution or the ••••n•day week in the mlnea and smel• 
ters, onoourasement or the deYelopmeat or new properties, 
and Metals Reserve CompaftT'• oontraota with speoirlc minoa· 
which were expected to 1noreaae produotion about 1501000 
tona annually. 
Ao l9! Reeor4!d Produotlon 
Beoause or ~eae tao tor a, do•atio produ.otion waa 
well on the rise in 1941 whioh aaw a aubatantial gain to an 
output or 9691lf9 short toaa, an iaoreaae ot 801000 over 19~. 
This upward trend or produ.o Uon aet the atage tor the exoep. 
tional outpu11 of 19<&21 in whiah the Premium Price Plan waa 
in operation tor eleven 1110n11ha. 'l'hb year's produotion waa 
1 10801061 tone, 'l'h1a waa exoeeded by more than 10,000 tona 
in 19<&3, the year ot greateat do .. stio produetion in history -
1,0901 918 short tons#. hom th1a peak production, output 
gradually dwindled. 
'l'he moat oomplete tabulation of the produotion ot 
copper durin& the u.re or the plan aeema to be tba t appearinS 
in the Minerals Yearbook l9f' ot the Bureau or Minea which ia 
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1h0Wn on the next Pa&•• !h!1 ll••• yery oomplete data ot 
all oopper production, at oeillDS and subal~ prioea. It 
il ot inte:reat to note that preaiua_oopper al1o reached ita 
pro~otion peak 1n 1143 aal 'hereafter waa apparently attoo-
to4 by Jllll17 of the taetor1 whioh :reduoo4 produo111on in non-
prollillll 1111Del • 
Prolliua oopper 1a lhown to have gown paduall7 1n 
proportion to the oYera11 produo~ionl namely, from 10.77 per 
oent ot 1141'• production to 17.43 per oent ot that ot 1941, 
the laat ot the war JUI'a~ A aeYOI'e at:r~ke in tbe major oom-
paDiea 1n 1046 did not atteot _,.~ mln•• pneral1y, and 
tonnage pro4uotion, althoulb aligntly 1e111 amounted to 
34. '1$ per oent ot total proclv.otiS.oa. It 18 probable that the 
downward reY1a1on ot quotaa .. ntioaod on Page 73 and the 1n-
atltu111on ot "apeolal" prelliUIII ohanpd a powing proportion 
ot produot1on at oe111Ag p:r1eea to p:readum prioe produotlon 
during 19431 19441 1145. Suoh an lntlatlon obaourea the taet 
that tho inoreaalns p:remiua prodllotlon cannot be ent1:rel7 oon-
aldered aa the auamented p:ro4uotion which waa oonte.plated 1D 
th~ o:ri&inal oonoepta of tho plan. Data OD thil phaae of pre-
mium produotion al'e not aYa1lable 1 but it aeema log1oal 11o 
aaau.e that aoma gain• on prealua prloe production oama trom 
tormor oeillng pr1oe prodaeera. 
B. P:rodalotlon at Ceil!¥ Pl'ioe 
When the Pl'llliua Price Plan wae under oona1derat1on, 
Salient statistics coverinc bonus payments 1 of the Government, 1942- 47 
1942 (February-
! lf!<'eln ber) ~~· 1945 19t6 1~7 (January-June> 1~:!--47 
l'roduct low 
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f•-nl production'-- -- . 
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tons 'nt total tons 
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of total 
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I l I . ·I 
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100.01
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Tot ILl Tll!al 
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Tl)taJ 
'9.61 
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I Frum pultlishf'd 81111 unpuhl!~hPd r!'port,; or the omr('\ or l'riet' .-\dministmrion and 
thl' Ollirc of Premium J'rin· l'lan fur Copp•~r. J.('a<l. nnd Zinc. Ellrludcll <'Xplorntilln 
premiums totaling $t1,213,5-t5 pai<l from July I, 19-16 t hruu~:h Hfeemht.•r 31, 1947 to en-
coumge ex. plomtion and development or copJX•r, h'ad, and zinc !lepo~its; this total can-
not he broken down by metal•. 
:Jauuary-Octotx>r. A and t'perial quotas nnd pn~rn!urn paymt'nt~ fur Xov!'mh!'r and 
Dt:'f~mher are not -~parahlt> an•l am shown with footnote 3. 
I •rota! A an•! ~Il('<'iftl quoti\S and Itr!'mium payments for Xo,·emher and D~; 
!'t'parati<•n hy kinds not available. 
• Treasury I'ro(:Urt'lllf'lll Division contrarts In 1942. 
s From monthly l'f'P••rtsof the Bureau of ~fim•s; do not exactly cheek ftoal annual 
for the Unitcd :,;tutcs ex<i'pt for 19-13. • Not reported. 
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it waa a baslo thesis that moat oopper would be produoed at 
oe111q prlo"• It waa telt that 111 would OO!Il8 :trom tbe 
properties ot the bis three, AnaooDda, Xenneoott, and Phelps 
Dodge. The remarkable 1norease 1n prodUoti9n by these com-
panies is listed belowa 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
Souroe 
Production ot Big Three (In Short 'l'ona) 
Anaoonda. X:eaaeoott Phelps Dode;e 
126,680 :560,883 159,.532 
127,179 409,884 181,790 
1:5'7,262 4'70,580 22:5,468 
132,166 472,960 239,155 
111,036 406,01'7 229,576 
83,661 389,836 180,296 
56,329 203,489 169,639 
54,759 :569,856 142,522 
- .AnnUal P'inanoial Reports 
Total 
647,095 
718,793 
831,310 
844,301 
746,629 
593,191 
429,457 
666,537 
.Anaoonda, X:enneoott, aJid Phelps Dodge benefited 
trom vemium prloes to a lllinor de&l'e• and this aooounts in 
part tor the total produotloa listed abo•• differing from 
oeiling prioe produotlon ot Table Vl, Page 91. Tbe extent 
ot the benefit as 1110asured by output is not available. The 
faot that the bulk ot tnia 1nereaae in production was aooo~ 
plished at oei11ns pr1ees in spite of repeated was• 1noreaae1 
and 1noreaaes 1n the ooat ot supplies 1a a measure of the 
ettioieno7 of these oompan1es &I well aa an 1ndioat1on of 
their efforts to support war produot1on. 
o. ~ Prioe !1! PPellliua gopper 
The &l'&duall7 1nueasins ooat of prelllium copper i1 
retleotad in data shown 1n 'fable VI, Page 91. '1'h1a 1neraa .. 
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wu due ma1Dl;r to lewviq of quo11aa and the •apedal• pre-
1111\111\o It roae trom all aTerage of 16.94 oenta pv pound 1D 
1942 to a wartt.e high of 18.03 in .1944. In the non-war 
;rear ot 1946 111 averaged 11.24 oen11a a pound, a pr1oe whioh 
retleoto an 1noreaoe in tbe oeiliDg prioe in Auguot, 1946, 
to 14 3/8 oento a pound. ~• tlMt halt ;rear the plan ••• et-
teotive 1D 194'7, it averaaed 21.111 oeats. !he highest prioe 
paid per pouad ._. ss.ee oea~a ln 19f6. Shortly at11er Auguot 
1946, ooppe:r wae. treed tro• oontnl and prieea roee aharply. 
Both prioe 1noreaeeo redlloed the .. ouat ot pre1111ua pa7JHD.h 
aubotantliall;r by tlMt ellmina~on ot any produoere wbo at 
higher prioea lllOl'i ted no ouboid;r • 
~or the 118Xlal11l ettMt ot premiUIUI upon ooat, n 
abould be noted that the b1&baa11 averase prlee tor total do._ 
eotio oopper prodDot1on dRr1fts the war yeara wao 13.65 oenta 
a pound or .0165 oen\a abon t;he oeUlag 1D 1945. !hie 1a 
the real meaaure ot tbe auooe.. ot the hemiua P:r1oe Plan. 
Do Deoltntgs po .. at1o Prof!tt1on aad Ita 9Juaea 
'!'be main oauoe of clw1ncl11q produotion was the ooa. 
t1ma1ng labor ahortase t1rot evident 1D 1142. 'l'h1a bMame ao 
aerioua that in 1941 u4 1943 the al'll7 releued 6600 .. a tor 
work in ooppe:r Dlineo. 'fbey •••• l'eleaoed tor work oaly 1n 
lllinea ot highest pro4uot1vit;r lood011 1n areae ot oriUoal 
labor ahortase• !!.'he tuJolftChlng eased the a1 ft&tion but; d14 
not oolve it, aad w1th1D a abort pel'iod a aubotant1al. propor. 
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t1on ot the t'\u"loupecl ~~en had lett the minoa. Raorui tins 
waa uader11aken an4 trainiq cO\U"aea tor haohing men about 
copper llin!Dg were w111htecl. 11hlle theae were of greater 
benefit than the t'\u"louped. aoldiera, the7 were inadequate 
aolufliona. At thia U• tlbe•• waa ~ reduction in tonnage 
of ora llinecl b7 ahovell 1n open-p111 operationa, but under• 
ground minea reported a aubatantlal deoreaaa 1n mine output.• 
'l'he llhortap of labol" waa accentuated in 19<&4. Bot 
on17 were there no fluolougbecl UJIT •n but tlratt def'ermenh 
beoama more d1f't1oult to obtain. Reoruitlng from leas eaaen-
t1al 1n4uatr1aa, pqbl1o1t7 about the need tor patriotic man, 
and importation ot .-n from Jamaiea were methode undertaken 
to aoln the proble•• 
Gradually the lhortap of' labor hand1eappad even 
theae large compen1ea. Kenaeoo11t tn ita 1943 tinanoial re-
port ••7•• wconaiderable dittioult,. • even in vital manpower 
areas - eldated tbPougbou.t the yeu 1n getting a.tf'io1ent nwa-
ber ot a•plo,-eea to operate the planta at maximum capacity 
eohedulea. 'l'he labor ahortage did aot reeultl in any reduction 
in toJmap ia open pit operaUou but 1n underpound mlaea 
there waa a aubatant1al d-.reaae 1n output.• In 1944 111 re. 
' ported, wAn acute lhortage of' ak1Uecl and unak1lled labor 
b-.ame more aevera bougbout the 7•••• output waa down and 
evan amaller percentage of' eaaentlal prellllllnary aurf'aoe atrip. 
ptq and Wlderpouad develo.-nt waa poaa1ble • It tollowa tha11 
* 19, P• 188, 1943 
a further decline 1n copper output will likel7 be unaYOidablo 
unlosa aome relief to the manpower .ttuation 1a aoon at.tordocl." 
Phelpa Dodge 1n ita report ot 1942 and 1943 ooiiJillnted upon the 
labor shortage created b7 the high wages of Pae1t1c Coast ship.. 
7ards and upon tho pregzoam ot ooa;penaa.t1ng t<r this b7 tira1n-
1ng more wo .. n and also Navajo ID41aa.. 
In 19461 preduction ooniil.mecl the dool1no and was 
21 per cent below 194<1 and fi per oent below the record o.t 
1943. It was <illo ma1nl7 to tho oont1nn1q 1nab1lit7 ot tho 
government and operator• to solve tihe labor ahOrtage problem 
and to the 1nott1c1en07 ot ~· labor available.• In tbo laat 
quarter ot 1945 atter V-J Da71 the copper m5nSng 1ndRatl"7 waa 
road7 tor reconversion to a poaoetlae baaia. This waa do1a7od 
b7 conflict be1ween lllllllage .. nt and labor. oonoern1q wagea, bo• 
nuaea. and aiailar mattera. These carried over into earl7 
1946 and hampered prOduction sreatl7• F1nall71 wnen tbeao 
.. ttera were aett;lod, the minas had an ava1lab111117 ot man-
power tor tbe t1rat time in a&n7 70&1'1• This waa reflected 
tavorabl7 in 1947 wbAin alae outpa.t JOOae 39 per oont an4 produc-
t1v1t7 per man hOur ot roooYerablo ooppor roae 9 per oento. 
Thia waa a 70ar ot bottler labor•aanaseaent relatione, abaenee 
ot atr1koa, and tbe h1poat pr1ooa 1n a gen.ration. 
x. suppUfl Q.t qoppp JMr:tgs world .!!£ .!1 
The unpreoodentod eona~1on ot these 7oara waa 
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.. , by restriction ot oiTllian uae, allocation of supplies, 
increasing pi"'duotion (in the beg1nn1.ng} ~ and by illJI!)rtaUon . 
ot llill1ona ot tone ot copper, u abown by Ohpt !I, Page 97. 
In 1943, when do ... tio production waa at a peak, the United 
Nations produetion waa very h1gn and juat about in balance 
with consumption. 8hipmen\a ot copper to Great BrUa1n ti'Om 
Atr1oa hed been oeeded up by HSUJIPtf.On ot the Mediterranean 
routes. Rwaora ee.rly in l9U hinted that Rhodealan copper 
pi"'duotion llipt be out 20•iUS per oent.. '.Phis cU.d not pron 
to be a feet and, althougb there waa no aurplua ti'Om Africa, 
laporte 1n 19-64 w.zoe near the peat. At'tel." the war, it waa 
the oonaenaua that world ooniiUIIlpt1on would be large enough 
to require the world's unauba1d1aed p1"0duct1on tor a DUmber 
ot yeara. Beoauae of the inadequacy ot United States produo• 
Uon, our foreign purohaeiq polioy was resumed, and reverae 
lend-leaae from Britain a~nted our supplies. In addition, 
in 1947 the 4 oenta per pound e~iae tax on imports waa re-
oeaaed tor two years to stimulate imports. 
11'. Bandioap! !2 Production J)u,riru5 the .!£ Y!J.!• 
A handloap to all-out production of oopper muat 
have exlatecl tor lld.ners and operators alike 1n the laok of a 
apee1f1o production objeot1Te ancl in the oont11111ed oha..ngtq 
ot aipte. "When the Premi'Wil Pl'loe Plan waa first p11t 1nto 
effect, ••Umatea or requir-.nts were so 1nde1'1n1te that no 
goal oould be aet other than '•xS•• posdble outPQt' toward 

which \he Quota CoaUtee . ai•ct. ACI the fortunes ot war 
took on a favorable turn toward the «:ld ot 1942, aaore pre-
cise toreoa1ta be•••• posdble. ·• 1D 1943 oopper wu no 
longer the outstanding oritioal .. terial, and in JannarJ, 
1944, 1 t wu reduced hom Group I to Group II on the npp1J 
11st x x x, Group II being those in approzilllate balance.•• 
•tn lfovellber 194.3, the War Production Board aDDO'Wl• 
oed that sp .. ial eopper premS.llll prS.oee, under the plan in 
etteot Ma:r 1, 194.31 would not be pdd on appl1oat1ona post-
lllal"ked after Deoellber 31. A1'10ther outpowth ot the easier 
situation w•• the l'ec!uot1on in the sl'k week on oertdn pro-
pel'tiea.•** 
These opt1.S.at1o foreouts proved to be wrong and 
in Deoelllber 19431 due to an 1Ul1'aW>rable turn in the war, o. 
E. Wilson of the WPl\ annoW!Ieed a sberp exPansion 1ll the gen-
eral overall defense propt&lll tor 1944. H1a appeals went out 
to indnstrJ and labor tor their utmost contribution to oul'Z'ent 
requirements and be sa141 •s.t workers leave \bail' joba dul'ing 
the Suaer 1110ntlhs as thq did in the laat ho yeau, there 
will be a serS.oua orS.ais.•*** !he eer1ouaneaa ot the situa• 
t1on was oont1Pm84 by the 11'10reaeed deliveries of copper to 
u1era after February, 1944, and the establilhment of a new 
peak tor deliveries in Ma7• POr .the three months ending 
Ma71 19441 total deliveries we•e higher \ben tor any s1111lar 
• 19, f•'lu, 1943 
**lt. lh• • • 
***19, p~ 136, 1943 
period. Reoo~ 1~rte and the _.r1Y8l ot battletleld aorap 
helped to auatdn thl!t pa.oe •. 
Another factor wbloh ma7 have tntluenoed a declin-
ing output wee the tiling in Oongreaa ot a Stockpile Bill tor 
oopper in 1043. It did not beoOJH law bu.t the debate about 
1t III8.Y have oaueed doubts aa to the urgency ot copper produo• 
t1ono In 1944 the SIU'plue Propert7 Act p:rovided tor govern-
ant atook p1ling of copper until pe:rmanent bgialation waa 
passed. 
While ohan81D8 tor11unea ot war 1 not to:re .. en by the 
moat brilliant ot atrategiata, may have oont:r1buted to the 
oont1nuall7 ohaDg1Jl8 dewpolnte ot thoae in oharge ot our 
utala propU181 U cannot be CIGilbted that euoh oontu.aion 
09 
had a bearing upon prodllotlon and upon fluctuating labor toroee~ 
VIII Prodaet1on ot Copper UDder the 
Detenee Procluot1on Act ot 1950 
AI pointed out prev1oualy in Section VB, the Detenae 
Pl'odUo t1on Act ot 1950 OP1ginall7 proVided ".for loana ( 1nolu4-
1ng participation in, 01' sua:rant1ee of) to pr1vate bu.a1n••• 
entePpr1aea tor the exPana1on ot oapao1t7, the develop .. nt ot 
teohnolog1oal prooeaaea, or the pro4uet1on ot eaaent1al mater-
lela, 1nolud1q the e.xplora tion, development, and m1n1ng ot 
atrateg1o and or1t1ca1 .-tala and mlnerala". After 1n1t1al 
atepa had been taken to etteot theae PIU"PGaea, the Act waa 
amended J'ul.7 31, 1951 to pronde •tor auba147 payments on &DJ' 
auoh domeat1eal17 produced material•. 
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The oopper 1nduatry in the united states and 1n 
the world waa 1n an entirely d1Zrerent condition 1n 1950 
than it wu prior to World War II• Prior to the war, oon-
. sumpt1on and production were aub-aormal and there was an 
exceas capacity or copper produeing tao111t1es. SUbseqment 
to world War II and up to 1950, a great rise in the world• 
wide consumption or copper appl'oaohed. the produotive oapaeUy 
of the world. The United St.tea had been an exporter of oop. 
per until the late 1930'• but beoame an 1111P0l'ter dul'ing the 
war due to the iiiiDlenae expaneion 1n ou oon81UlPt1on of copper 
and to our declining share of the world '• production. Before 
World War II, the United States ooaaumed about one-third ot 
the world's produotionJ attar the war and before Korea, this 
1noreaeed to about 40 per oen.tJ and during the current de-
tense period it ia eat1mated that this country will oou.ume 
annually about 58 per cent of the hoe wol'ld'a production. 
Of this production, the United States will account for approx-
imately 35 per cent. By euch .. aaurementa it would seem tbat 
the United States will remain an lmporting nation. 
The .. tach 1n41oated that tbo production and d1e-
tr1bution of ooppor wae a world p:roblem which actually ooul.d 
affect our defenee program. Therefore, it was only natural 
for the United States to take a lea41ag part 1n organizing 
in Washington, the International Matleriala oonterenoo oou1a• 
ting of 2'1 ot the major produo1ng and consuming natiou.. one 
ot ita aeven committee• formed he• tho re•pona1b1lity ot 
aolTing world-wide pl"oblelU of copper, lead and zinc. 'l'hia 
committee hlla made a pre11milhll'7 lllU"Yey ot the extent and 
character of the world ahrn•tage of' copper, hu exchanged in-
f'orma.tion on meena of' conserving 1t, and haa s;lven impetus 
to the expiU'l.sion of' pl'Oduotion. 
A. $ttpa Dedmed lg, SUJ!!late P£0duet1on 
1.. In l'ol"ete CCJ!Ultrha 
u part of' our program 1n :toreJ,gn t1elda, loana 
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haYe been made tor exploration ot mineral deposita 1n a n~ 
ber or Ma.rahall Plan oountr1ea and their dependencies, not-
abl7 in the Belgian Congo. In Oh1le, loans tor expansion and 
priorities foP minlng and milling equipment! haTe been gran•ed• 
Bul7 in 1951, an i1ap0rtant agreement was made with 
the government of Chile, which pl'Odueed one-sixth of the to-
tal output of the tree world in 1960. In l'eturn tor a three-
cent per pound price increase (to 2V 1/2, three oenta above 
ceiling), it was agreed that the,. would make available to the 
United States SO pel' cent of the production ot American•owned 
m1nea in that ocunt1'7• Of the zoemain1ng 20 per cent, Chile 
agreed to limit exports to the e .. ential needs of' triendl7 
oountr1... Iaoreased pl'Od.uotion waa alao provided tor 1n tbia 
agreement. 
2. In let Un1ted Stat .. 
'!'he major objeot1Te of our domestic copper program 
has been to 1nereue tNt auppl7 of' ore. Tbla 1a a long-l'ange 
un4ertak1ag, even when aouroea of' ore are known to e:dat and. 
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are awaiting development. Where exploration tor ores is 
needed before developm.nt can begin, the time factor required 
to increase supplies is even greater. All these delaying tao• 
tors lim! t the pro4uc tion of add111ion.a1 supplies ot copper 
e.nd explain wh,- substantial fl.dditlons to domestic supplies 
cannot be foreseen until 1963 or 19M. 
'l'o assist in this expauion program, the gOYern111ent 
has employed a number of devieesr aemel,-, accelerated tax aa-
ortisation, purchase and resale of vital material, direct 
loans to business, loan guarantees, colll!llitments to purchase 
at specified noor prices, a!ld gov8l't2Diellt financing ot part 
(50 per cent) ot the coat ot exploration tor miraerala. 
(a) The moat important ot these devices 18 accel-
erated tax amortisation, wbloh enables a varying portion of 
plant costa to be written ott tor tax purpo .. s at the accel-
erated rate of 20 per cent annually. Certificates tor acoel• 
erated tax amortization covering $11.4 billion in proposed 
plant expansion ot all types have already been 1a$1ed• DIU,o .. 
ing the latter part or 1951, applieationa tor thee• oert1ti-
catea were processed with •ores such as copper, lead, and 
sino, second in order or urgeno7••• In ••tal lllining, this 
haa amounted to app:rorlmatel7 tp million or the $11.4 bil• 
lion involved. 
(b) The sovernment has allotted $89 million tor 
• 9 , P• 1~ .ith 'Quute:rly 
the purchase of copper, throup aeTeral types of tra.naactiou 
and $5.4 :nd.llion for its e.xploratio"" In add1Uon, on Decem-
ber 1, 1951, the ~QVernm.nt allooateq $30 million tor con-
tracts with high•oost copper producers who otherwise might 
have had to suspend produot!.on. These contracts are author-
ized to cover proc1uct1on up to 100,000 tons annually from 
1952 through 1954. 
1oa 
(c) Oop1ea ot apeoit1o agreema~ts of various types 
for production of copper are peaented here to sho.w in great• 
detail the type and scope of the ar.rangementa whiah have been 
designed to stimulate or ~in\ain the production of copper 
under the terms ot this Act. 
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Per Immediate Release, MOnd87, Sept. 24, 1951 
In a 1110ve to inOl'eaae ~ production of copper tor 
stockpiling aDd other defense needa, the government haa 
reached an agreement with the Copper Oit!.es Mining 00IIlP&Jl1' 
that will provide 221 500 tone ot the metal a year, Jess Lar-
son, Administrator ot \be :DefeDae Materials Proeuremant Agency 
announced today. 
'fhe copper will ooae from ore m1ned at the oom~yta 
GUa County ore body near r.u.ams., Arizona. 
The agreeMnt calls tor Copper Cities to undertake 
a $15,2001000 expauion propoam tor additional eqlliplllltnt to 
mine and treat the ore. 
In turn, DM.PA has apeed to bu71 at 23 cents a 
pound, up to 170100o,ooo pounds ot the tirst 1921 5001 000 
pounds produced by the n .. facilities providing the compan7 
cannot sell it to other purchasers in the United States at 
a higher price. 
The n .. tac111tiea1 wbioh haVe an annual oapacit7 
ot 221 500 tons, are expected to go into produo111on in Octo. 
bu ot 1954. 
For Immediate ~elease, MOnday, Sept. 241 1951 
The goverw.nt toda7 aa.ured a tul'tner iDDl'eaae 1n 
copper production in tne United Statea by advancing $60 1 000 
for working capital to the Nortn Blltte Mining Compen7 tor ex-
pansion of their facilities at the Granite Mountain Mine nee» 
Butte, Montana, Jess Larson, Administrator of the Defense Ma• 
teriala Procurement Agenc71 announo&d toda7• 
The company baa a leaching operation at th8 aUe 
which will be enlarged to produce a 7earl7 output of approxi• 
matel7 7 .ooo,ooo pounds ot ceunt oopper. 
The OOmpafl7 will repay the gonrnment through deli• 
veey ot $60 1000 worth ot copper which DMPA has agreed to pur-. 
chaso at 24 l/2 cents a pound. 
**••••• .. •• 
Pbr Immediate Release, Sept. 261 1951 
and the Phelps-Dodge Corporation will step up the production 
of copper for.stookpiling &Dd other defense needs by 381 000 
tons a year, Jess Larson, Adm1niatrator of Defense Materials 
Pl'oourement Agenoy, announoed., 
The copper will oolll8 from ore mined at the Bisbee 
East Ore Body of the. corporation•• Copper Qlleen branch at 
.B1abee, Ariaona. 
Under terms of the acreement, PhelpsDodge will 
undertake a $251 ooo,ooo expansion program which includes 
the construction of a new oonoentratin~ and leaching plant 
at the mine site, as well aa enlaraement of ita smelter at 
Douglas, Arizona. 
DMPA 1 in tUpn, haa asreed to buy, at 22 cents a 
pound, up to 1121 500 tons ot the fbat 1501000 tons produced 
by the new facilities proYid1ng the corporation cannot sell 
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it to other purohaaera in the United states at a higher price. 
With a yearly oapacity of 3B1 000 tona, the new fac-
ilities are expected to go into production in late 1954 or 
early 1955. 
For Release to Morning Papers, Wednesday, Nov. 141 1951 DMPA-11 
An asreement wbioh Will increase the domestic pro-
duetion of copper by more than 301 000 tons annually has been 
signed by the Defense Materials Procurement Agency and the 
Anaconda Copper Company. 
Jess Larson, DMPA Administrator, sa~ that Anacon-
da would produce the copper at Us Yerington Mine in Lyon 
County Neva.dao 
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The agreement stipulates that 606 000 1 000 pounds per 
year will be produced during the f'irst two years of operation. 
The production rate tor the remaining years will be 66 1000 1000 
pounds annually. 
Copper which the company oan~t sell to industrial 
users will be purchased by the government at 25 1/2 cents per 
pound, :f'oOobo midwest marketso 1'he goverlll'llent will take del• 
ivery at the compa~•s Great Falla, Montana ret1nery. 
DMP.A e.grees to take a maxillll1lll o:f' !5610001000 pounds 
dUring the :f'irst six years ot operation • 
. ~naoonda will invest approximately ~:32, 750 1000 in 
developing the property, whiah has an eet111111.ted life ot 10 1/2 
;;ears. It is believed that a 111in1llll1lll o:f' 3841ooo,ooo pounds 
can be produced within six years. 
Since the ore 1s o:f' an oxide variety which requires 
aul:f'Ur1c acid 1n 1 ts treatment 1 Anaconda is &oquiring the 
Leviathan Sulphur Mine in Alpine County, Calitarn1a 1 tor pro-
duction o:f' the acid needed to.treat the ore. 
Production will begin within two years. 
*****•••1!1• 
For Immediate Release, Wednesday, Nov• 281 1951 
Another step ~ aasure the nation ot 10II8•1"ange 
aupplJ ot domeat1o oopper waa taken today by the Def'enae Mat-
erial& Prooure•nt Age.noy When en apeei!Mtnt wu a!gnad with 
the Amerioen SJHltlag an4 Ret1n1ng eoapa~ und.erwrit!Dg new 
prodnotion ot 19,,0001000 pouada over a 5 l/2 year period. 
Jeaa Larson, Adm1n1etrator ot DMPA, said the Co~ 
pany will expand ita SilTer Bell Mine taoilit!ea located in 
Pi lila County, Arhona 1 with a $1 '7 10001000 deYelopunt • 
.Annual produot1on ie expeoted to be around the 
:581 2601 000 pound lllal'ko Under tbe apeement, the goyerDJilent 
will take up to 1 ?'7 10001000 poundll out ot the t1rat 19' ,ooo-
000 produoed, 1t the 00~7 1e. unable to aell 1t at the 
guaranteed prioe, wh!oh will be 14 l/8 oenta per pound, t.o.b. 
Conneotiout Valley. 
After 5 1/8 yeara .troa tho date prodnot1on bo81na, 
the goTei'DJil8nt•a responsibility to purohaae expires, but tho 
steady source ot oopper will oonttaue aa expeeta believe the 
area good tor 12 years' y1e14. 
Produetion will get underway within 8 years • 
............ 
Por Release to Morn1ne; Paper, 'lhura., D41oo 13, 19&1 DMPA•l& 
In a drastic mcve to ..tntain max!wum dcmeatio oop. 
per prodnotion, the Oovernmerat today announoe4 that it 1a 
ready to negotiate over-the-oe111ng oontraota with operators 
ot presently prOducing h1@b•oost ainea. 
Jess Larson, AdmJnSatrator ot the Detense Materials 
Procurement ASeDOy, said the aotion is necessary to even ain .. 
ta1n the domest1o produot1on ot copper at ita present level 
beoaua• oert.,ia p1"04Uoe:Pa are UDable to pperate UDdeP the ex-
ht1ag oe111Dg prioe due to thdr high 1111n1Dg 0011ta, 
The p:peaent oe111Dg pr1oe on copper ia 24 l/2 oenta 
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Mr-. La:Paon add that hla agency 1a negotiating over-
the-oe111ng~em.nta with operators of nine mines whose an-
nual outpllt 1a approx1•t•17 16•000 tona,. 
"These operatora haY• 11ldioated that w1thout prioe 
rel1et the7 would have to oeaae p1"0CIIlotion,," 1111' • Laraoa said •. 
11In taoe ot the oritloal copper abortage and the tremendous 
a1110unt or the metal needed in ov detenu prodltot1on, t think 
1t is in the beat interests of the Dation to do eY81'7thing 
within reason to keep these lllines in operation." 
1111'~ Larson atreaaed that onl.7 lllinea now in opera .. 
tion will be involvede. Eaoh iadlvtdual •••• will be oaretull7 
anal7aed and the ovn prioe panted will be the a1110unt oona1-
dered neoea.aa•r to •1nta1n p1"04lloUon. 
'l'he period OoYered b7 the agreements wUl Ya1'7 ao-
oording to eaoh mine'• 1nd1dclual o:lrOUilllltamoea, but the ~-
1IIIWII period will be three 7•ar••. 
The mines will be -.ubj•ot to review by a requi:'eJRSnt 
that they report operating data to DMPA every aix months, or 
lea so: 
............ 
PoP Rdeaae Wednesday Morning Papers,, Jan. 16, 1952 DJIPA•U 
More than l,ooo,ooo pounda ot copper per month will 
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be added to the .uppl7 available to induatr7 for defenae pur. 
poaea, 11114er tleru of a oontrac11 annouJlced tocla7 b7 Jeaa La1'• 
aon, Adm1n1atra11or of 1lb8 V.fenae .. teriala Procurement Asenc7. 
'!'he agreement ia between DIIPA and the Calumet and 
Heela Conaolidated Copper CompaftT ot Calumet, Mleblsan. 
'!'he government will P87 over-11he-ce111ng prieea tor 
the copper beoauae otherwiee the depoai ta would be abut down 
and the production loat due to ooat taotora. Mr. Larson aa14 
that the ursent neoeaaifl7 to bl'lftl more production into pla7 
at onee, plua a carefUl review of the coat. involved to the 
oompan7 in working thea• propertlea,• led to the deoiaion to 
pay over•the-oeiling prlcea. 
Under the oontract tei'JU, CalUJHt wlll operate te'IU 
11hish coat" deposita and reeeive paymenta in exeeaa of the 
prevailing ceiling of 14 5/8 oenta per pound for Lake oopper. 
DMPA will uke up the ditferaoe between the oe1l1ng and the 
following prioea, wbioh are tor dellvorloa at Hubbell, lieb-
lgana 
Iroquoia M1ne••••••••••30•1 
No. 4 Kearsarge Mlae ••• 3l 
Pon1naula M1ae ••••••••• at.6 
Alloues Mine No. Sooooo29•7 
oonta per lb. 
" . " 
1'1 1'1 " 
• • It 
Tho llinea aro all looate4 1n Houghton and Keweenaw 
Countioa of MiChigan. Price varianoea take into account dif• 
terenoea 1n production ooata, arrived at after tho oompan7 
aubmlttod atatomenta whloh wore examined by tho DMPA. 
ll'lrat ·of Ua typo tbua far signed, tho agreement 
aeta tol'mlnation datoa on oaoh mine, aooord.ing to known ro-
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serves, extending in the earliest case trom December 31, 1952 
through lay 311 1953. 
"The agreement ia oanoellable on aixty daya' notioe." 
vr. Lareon se.1d, "and in the evut that oeiling prices on cop. 
per are removed, the hifl)l-coet PI'OViaions will automatically 
terminate. 
. .......... . 
Bote to Ed1 tora Jan. 22, 1952 
Releaae No. 23, 1asued by the Defense Materials 
Procurement A.dminiatration on 'lueacky, JanuapY 151 announced 
aigning ot contracts with 11he Oalwaet aD! Hecla Consolidated 
Copper Compaft7 tor the production ot "hign eoat" copper. 
'l'he !'eleaae atated that •more than 11 000 ,ooo pounda 
ot copper per month will be added to the supply available to 
industry tor defense purpoeea," but also statedt "'l'he govern-
ment will pay over-the-seiling prioee tor the copper because 
otherwise the depoe1te would be abut down and the production 
lost dBe to coat taotora." 
The statement of January 15 has been interpreted in 
some quarters that the agreement involved increased prodne-
tion ot oopper. 
Such is not the case. The mines 1n'901Ved are ex1at-
i!l ones which could not oonUwe to deliver their GUrrent 
level ot copper output unless h1gn eoat factors are overcome. 
DMPA iuued a policy statement on December 13 (DMPA 
lo. 16) specit1oally indioatins ita readiness to negotiate 
over-tbe-oeil1n& contracts wtlh "operators ot presently pro. 
duo1ng high coat mines, tt 
Ul 
At that Ume, Je .. Larson, Adminiatrator of' DMPA 
ea·1d1 "••• .The .. operatOI'a have 1nd1oated lbat without price· 
relief th.,- would have to oeaae pro<J:nction. In the face of' 
the critical copper abOrtaae ••••• I think it ia in the beat 
intereata of' the nation to do everything within rea.aon to 
keep these mines in operation•••••" 
The January 1~ announcement was, therefore, concer-
ned with existing lld.nea, and the over-the-ceiling policy still 
relatea only to euch min••• 
(d) A ~ of the exploration oontraota provided 
tor by the Aot 1a also preaented here to provide 1110re detail 
and 1nfo1'1118.tion about 11h1a type of ar:rangement fol' eventual 
increased produot1ont 
DEPAR'lDHT OF THE IN'J.'ERIOR 
Int<Drmation Service 
Detenee Mineral& Adm1n1atrat1on1 
FOr Releaae Sunday, October 14, 1951 
Total ot 160 Exploration Contlraoh Si&ned by DJ!A 
Approval and a1gn1ng ot 17 new minel'al exploration 
project oontraota in 10 atatea during the laat halt ot sep. 
tember was announced today by Secretary ot the Interior os-
car L. Chapman, raisins the total ot such contracts to 160 
since the start ot the Defense Minerals Administration'• 
finano1al aasia\anee propam in aearoh of critical and stra-
tegic llinaral reserves last April. 
The contracts 3ust completed cover explorations 
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for lead, zinc, tuncaten, oopper, xxxxxxx and the projects 
are in 10 states • Mont.aa1 Idaho, Colorado, Wiaconain, Utah, 
California, Wevada, 4~lahoma, Missouri, and south Dakota. 
Coat of the new projects will be $7061~4, of which the gov-
ernment's share will be $3141122 or 52,97 per cent, 
The aggregate coat of the 160 projects so far appro-
ved by DMA is $91 0871 246,61, of which the government's contri-
bution is $51 4101 S48,94 1 or 59,54 per cent, wbile private in-
dustry's invsatment is $31 6761 891,68• These 160 projects are 
in 20 states and Alaska, Colorado leads with 2B projects, 
followed closely by IdahO with 211 Montana with 191 North 
Carolina with 161 California with 12 and Utah with 10. 
Under the terma ot the Defense Production Act, the 
DMA ia authorized to provide financial assistance for explo• 
ration projects on a modified matching basis, contributing 
so, 751 or 90 per oent of the coat1 depending on the mineral 
aougnt. The government contributes 50 per cent toward ex-
ploration coats for copper, 
The exploration prosram started in April of this 
year, and of the 160 projects approved through September, 
73 were in queat of lead and sino, 23 tor tungsten, 16 tor 
strategic mica, 9 for copper, 6 tar beryl-mica, 5 each for 
aabeatos, Ml'OUI'Y and lll&llganese, 4 tor ant11il0ny and the bal• 
anoe tor other soarce commodities. 
llS 
According to existing re~lationa governing the 
financial asaiatanoe program, DO exploration project that re• 
quires lllOre than two years to COIIlPlete will be considered, 
and. repayment ot the gover~nt 'a oontribll tion Dlllat be 111a.de 
hom the net remrna, 11' any, trolll the ores, oonoentrates, or 
metal prodUced as a result ot the exploration projects. This 
repayaant regulation provides tbat within six months attar 
completion ot a project the government mnat decide 1t a dia-
ooverJ or delineation has reaulted wh1oh ma7 prodUce commer-
cial ore. 11' ao, the goVel'!Dll!llnt notllties the operator who 
then will be obligated to pay tbe government a percentage 
royalty on the net aaelter re~s ·or other net prooeeda re-
alised trom the ore, ~noent:aoates, or metal produced wit;hin 
ten years trom the date at the oontract until the total a• 
mount contributed by the aoveftllll8nt, without 1Jtterest, ia 
1'ully repaid, or the 10 years ha1'e elapeed• wh1ohe1'er ooours 
til• st. 
Stratepo ilaportanoe ot the mineral in't011'ed 1a one 
ot the prime tactora weisned by the DMA in considering appli• 
cations tor tinano1al assistance. Others are tbe geologic 
probability ot aisn1t1oant discoveries, the availability ot 
manpower, suppliea and equipment, the accessibility of the 
proposed project, water and power auppliea, and. the operatiq 
experience and aharaoter ot the applicant. 
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Only bona fide owners aDd lessees ere eligible fOr 
exploration project assistance. and every application is 
thOroughly investigated before beiDg 11pproved or rejected. 
Government tunds advanced for exploration projects can be 
used only for "rea.sonable, necessary, end direct coets of 
performing the exploration," includ:lng the coat ot ~~~e.teriala, 
supplies,. labor, direct auperviaion, engineering, power, 
water, utili ties, etc • However 1 the use of fUnds tor admin-
istrative expanses not directly connected with the project 
1a prohibited, such aa all 1tema ot general overhead, corpo .. 
ra.te IIIA11sgament, and interest on borrowed money • 
(e) Se..,..al other pro'eota tor the production ot 
copper involving tbe Reoonat.uotion Pinanoe Corporation aot 
rapol'ted by pvern~aant aCRU'oea llut repo:rfled b7 U• Jfaguine 
Boveaber 26, 1951, IU'e t 
"Laat week the (pve.-.s '!look two big steps to 
boost copper pi'Oduot1on. One step was taken by the RFC. It 
lent $57 million, ita bigsaat lOan s1noe world War II, to the 
White P:lne COpper co., a 11Ubeid1a17 ot Boatonta Copper Range 
co. 'lhe 110ney will be uae<l to develop ita holdings 1n M1ob1· 
go pen1naula1 whloh ue esti~~ated to have reserves of 309,. 
6601000 tons of ora and a potential copper output ot 35 1000 
tons a 7ear. Said Oopper Rose Praa1dant Morrie LaCroix, 
who has been ai"ter an RFO loan tor 13 110nth8 1 ~ 'Now thla 
sreat national aaaat will H put tO 11'01'k• I 
"'lh• news was good, llu 11 not good anougb. • !lone ot 
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the new White Pine production will ata:Pt until 1914. Be.to:Pe 
m1n1q begins, White Pine 11111at build a atelllll power plant, 
railroad oonnectiona, 111111 and a .. lter fao1lit1ea, and an en• 
tire new town to houae 21 725. 
•~atl"aoting oopper from 8Uah low•gl"ade ore ia enor• 
mously expeaatve. Because ~loration ia even mo:Pe expenaive, 
Anaconda ia now ping thl"ough old diggings to get; out 11he high• 
coat ore that bad been bypa .. ed. Anaconda el.one is spending 
$2'7 million to tap 130 million toone ot au.oh ore in ita taaed 
Butte, Mont. properties an4 anotbAP $100 million to prooesa 
lOW•gl"ade ore in Chile • 
•The lon&•l'ange outlook 1a not encouraging. In addi-
tion to Anaoonda Pel Copper Rani•, the sovernan t baa made 
plll"ohaae oontraots w1 th other produers, notably Phelps Dodge, 
to boost prqcluot1onJ o11hers like Kennecott (world' a lal"seat 
produoer) are doing it on their own. The total tnorease 1a 
expected to be 8461 000 tou a yeal" by 1955, roughly ao per 
cent ot present outl'llt• Blat by then, procmot1on of aoae of 
the older minea will,be on the deoltne. Barring a depl'easion, 
or an unexpected find of rioh new oopper deposita, the United 
States will never have a copper .Ul'plua again.• 
B. I,poreued P£C!dD.oUon ,!! .!!!! 
W1 thout benet1 t ot aubaidies and 111111 ted by a o•11· 
ins price ot 24.5 oents pel' pound atter JUly 1951, ooppel' 
produoel'a in the United Statea had an output ot 928,8'76 abort 
tone 1n 1951. 'fh1a Waa the sreateat produotion a:lnoe 1944. 
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In the first tive months ot the yelll" output increased stead-
ily and the rate tor April ind1oated a possible annual pro-
duction in excess of 1,000,000 tons. Beginning with June, 
~reduction slumped due to annual vaoat1ona and to luly, August 
and September strikes.# The deficit in production required 
a release of' copper trom the sovernment stockpile. With the 
end or the strikes, production increased rapidly and is now 
abreast of early 1951. 
Expansion programs undertaken by Anaconda and Itenne-
oott at their own expense and begun several years ago are ex• 
pected to add very substantially to prodUction in 1952 and to 
oontinue tor a number ot years. 
At the time of' this writing (May 1952) 1 it 1a repor-
ted by other than govermnent aolll'oes that the supply situation 
in copper is eaains and that possibly by the end of' 1952 supply 
will be so adequate as to permit the lif't1ns or consumption 
restrictions. such a step ~aken before production has really 
begun, under the special contracts and agreements outlined 
previously in this section, ausura well tor the supply situa-
tion of' the near tuture. The present softening ot commodity 
prices generally, including non ferrous metals, which has been 
reported also has a sisnitioanoe tor thia entire program. 
I Chart III, P• 117 
CJ;f~RT III 117 
This proet>dure applies for certificate's already 
issued as well as t host- to be issued in the future. 
MATERIALS: SUPPLIES AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
In our t>xpansion program for c<>rtnin matPrials, 
part ie1tlarly stPcl and aluminun1, Wl' han· focusPd 
upm1 adding facilitiPs to procpss a rPiatin•ly plt•n-
t iful supply of basie orcs. f TJw major objt>etive of 
our program in relation to many othPt' lllPtals, 
uotably coppPt', has to be an increase in thP supply 
of the Ol'l' itself. This, gcnemlly spl'aking, is a 
long-tcrln IIIHIPdaking, C'H'n wlwre sourcps of raw 
matpt·ial an• known to lw prPsPnt and awaiting 
deYPiopnwnt. "\Yiwre exploration for ores is 
llPNlPtl bdore dl•n•lopnwnt l':tn bt>gin) the titnP 1'('-
quirecl to inl'rC'ase s11ppli£'s is llN'essarily longC'r 
still. ~foreowr, om· s11ppl i£'s of many of tlwsp 
matl'rials depC'nu on exploration aml development 
in ot h£'r countries. 
Copper 
Prospl'ctive additional supplies of copper are 
lilllited by all of these delaying factors. New cop-
per ore bodies v.re awaiting deYelopment in Nc-
vada, Arizona. South America, and Alaska. Gov-
Cl'lllllPnt incl'ntin•s-inl'luding rapid tax amorti-
zation cPrtilieates, (ion•rnml·nt loans, and guamn-
tced purchase contracts-arc being considered to 
push forward tlw exploration and dcYelopment. 
Thus far, p11rdwsp ('Olltrads have hPPn si:!nC'd 
l'On•ri ng l:W,OOO tons ann u:dly of clonlPst ie pro-
dud ion. and ('Ontrads on another 8.),000 tons arc 
ht>ing twgot iate1l. 
TlH'se pmjPds, however, will not deliver 
Pnough ('Opp<'l' ill the lll'Xt ~ Ol' ;~ )'l':trs to meet the 
('XJH'I't P(l st P:tdy j n('l't'HSt' in dl'llHtnd. 
Ml':llm h ilP, the shut down of virtually all .Amer-
iean coppl'l' mitu•s and plants from A11gust 27 to 
St>ptt•mlwr 5 l'Ost the mobilization program about 
:~5,000 short tons of coppet·, which cannot be made 
up. The strike is not pntit·ply spttlt>d, but work 
has bPPil n•sullll'(l for the 80-day negotiation 
JWriod rPquin•d by law. 
· I...argPly as a n•sult of shutdow11s, domestic pro-
duet ion for 1!>51 is exlW<'tPd to remain at approxi-
matPly the 1!)i'i0 lt•wl. .At the same time, imports 
have dropped bN·ause of rising- world det11and. 
Copper allotments under CMP haYe therefore 
had to be tightetw<l. In addition, the list of pro-
hibited usps will be extended. 
While requirements for copper have increased ... 
imports have dropped... and strikes have cut U.S. production 
140 (Thous. of Short ons) 
Avg. Monthly Imports 
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IX Conelus1ona 
Ao EValuation of These !!£ Subsidy Plans 
Any evaluation of the Premium Price Plan should be 
considered from the main viewpoints of its effect upon pro. 
duetion and its cost. 
Data presented, particularly that on Table VI, paae 
91, indicate that overall production was stimulated for par' 
of the life of the Plano In 1943, production of domestic cop• 
per was at a new high and in this, the first fUll year ot 
operation of the Plan, ~premium" copper reached its peak ot 
production and accounted tor 22.88 per cent of total produc-
tion. While tonnege of "premium" copper fell from that time 
on, it did not fall as greatly as did that from "ceiling" 
sources. As a result the proportion or "premium" copper to 
the total produced increased to 27.43 per cent in the last 
war year. In 1946, a year of strikes among the major pro. 
ducers, premium copper, coming mostly from small producers, 
fell slightly in tonnage from 1945, At the same time ita 
proportion of total production went to 34.78 per cent. It 
must be remembered, however, that rather general reduction 
ot quotas end the special premium operated in some degree 
to change "ceiling" production to "premium•. This tended 
to accentuate the increase in the proportion of "premium" 
production. 
The direct coat ot the "premium" copper produced 
was $1181 8601 !42 trom 1942·1947 tor 11 0661 212 short tone•* 
* Table VI, P• 01 
U9 
Administrative costs were nominal and amounted to but $684-
958 for the entire life of the Plano* The premium cost pv 
pound tor this period averaged approximately 5e50 cents while 
the average cost. of all domeatioally produced copper was 
13e06 cents or lo06 above the ceiling price•** As measured 
by these costs, there would seem to be no question but thet 
the copper price policy was anti-inflationary. It was a res-
traint upon coats of civilian supplies and lowered the costa 
or war material to the benefit of allo 
or added coat was the immense tonnage of copper i-. 
ported as shown on Table v, page ~4. Eighty per cent of this 
was purchased at ceiling prices or less and twenty per cent 
at greater than ceiling ptticeao The bulk of it was purchased 
at a price delivered aboard ship, so the added cost of trans-
portation and of handling and treigbt at this end is a factor 
which cannot be ignored. Data on this cost has not been 
found in any recorda examined but it must have added aubatlan-
tially to the coat of imported copper. 
Any evlluation of the provisions of the Defense Pro-
duction Act of 1950 is difficult because this Act contemplates 
e. long-range prosr11111 which as yet has not b&gwl to opvate 
effectively. The specimen contracts outlined from pages 10~ 
to 114 point out that output under their proVisions will not; 
begin substantially until 1953 or 1954. Aa to coat, there 
might be a reasonable doubt raised about the prices guarant;eed 
* 15, P• 20 
** 181 P• 139 
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on them. Generally they range above the present ceiling 
price and some go more than 6 cents above ito The special 
contracts made with the Michigan producers would seem to be 
subject to question also. We nave seen how the payment or 
substantial subsidies to them in 1941·1947 did not re8Ult in 
inoreaaed production. The small amount of copper it is ex-
pected they will produce under the new program is so trifl-
ing that these contracts seem entirely unnecessary in a 
program of this magnitude. Since the priee of copper is 
determined in the world market, it seeDI8 illogical to extend 
a guarantee on prices several years into the future on a ba• 
sis of a ceiling price in 1951 •. As recently as 19491 domes• 
tic copper prices went from 23 1/2 cents a pound in March to 
16 cents within a few monthao This type of pricing arrange-
ment would seem to be justified only if the copper produced 
might end up being stockpiled and the cost considered to be 
part of our rearmalll8nt programo 
The recent softening or world and domestic commo-
dity prices, including non ferrous metals, which has been 
reported by non-government sources, may prove, if continued, 
to have an important bearing upon this program. 
Bo Shortcomings §xperienoed with These Plant 
Because or the pll.'evalent favorable appraisal of the 
value of these two plana, we must not fail to consider their 
shortcomings and to seek opportunities tor improvement in •imi• 
1ar projects or the tu11ure ba .. d on experience with these plana. 
To assist in arriving at conclusiona in this area it may be 
well to consider some or their anortcomings. 
1. Production Shortcomings 
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There 1a a reasonable d011bt that the Premium. Price 
Plan aocom.pliahad ita :Pilrpoae of obtaining maxilllllll production. 
The Report of the suboOlllllittee on 111n1ng and IIU.nerals Induat17, 
(Bibliography Hl8) on page 841 reads, "In retrospect it aeama 
that the Plan worked in. the expected taahlon tor moat ot the 
indust17 tor a tn months and haa oontlmled to do so ror a 
diminishing portion of the Industry since then." On page 98 
ot ths same report it aaya, "At the end of December there had 
been authOrised 2104 quota revlaione or an average of 700 a 
month sino• January 1942. During 1944 there were 525 revi-
sionaJ 392 ot these were dowaward revisions .. increased pre-
mium. payments .. and 133 were upward. The net balanoa of all 
revisions tor the year waa an 1aoreaae in premium paymants 
rate of $9561000 a aonth • estimated but not necessarily real-
ised." It alao reads, "up to Jlay 311 19451 3565 copper, lead 
and sino mines were assigned quotas under the Pramiwa Price 
Plan x x x. The balance of 403 1111nes tor various reasons 
made no shipments arter receiving quotas, some presumably 
due to reoeiving inadequate premium asaistanoe. • 
The Hlatory of the Premium Price Plan tor Copper, 
Lead and Zinc reads on page 16, (Bibliography #15), "Over 
3000 of the quotaa 1Bsued (oopper, lead, sino) want to small 
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lessees and prospectors who operated anywhere froa one month 
to one year aDd whose productions were aull and errat1o." 
In Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars on page 178, 
(Bibliography #3) we aee, "It the intention of the goTernment 
was to inoreaae production of Vioh1gan Copper during the war 
years, the au baldy progr- 11here could be oona idered a fail-
ure. Actually it aeel!lB probable that such was the intent 
only at the beginning of the wal' and that u the struggle pro .. 
greased, stab111sat1on or outp11t was hoped foro The real im-
portant question is not whether the government was aucceastul 
in attaining this more limited end but rather whether the 
ooata were not too high in tieing up resources critieally 
needed elsewhere. Precise data on what these marginal pro-
dueera received tor their oopper ue not available. That 
premiua prices of 20 cents a poUDd could not raise output to 
the 1935 level when average p:rlce was 9.5 cents is aolll81rhat 
startling • 'l'hia 1a a aeaaure or the advanoed stage o t the 
decline and was alao affected by labor developments." 
In the same book, pas- 177, we :read, "By the end 
ot the w~:r, approximately 25 per oent ot the copper was being 
pi'Oduced by mines receiving premiums while these same mines 
employed over 50 per eent of the labor in the industry," 
On pege 36 ot this thesis, we developed the point 
that the Copper Price commission appointed by the Governor of 
Miohigan, concluded that a 40 per eent increaae in output 
within two years could be expected if the industry was paid 
15 cents a pound for its copper. Pressure was put on poll• 
.tically and by labor to get such a subsidy. Table IX appeal"• 
ing in the Appendix shows how far from the fact this estimate 
was in spite of some prices in excess of 20 cents a pound. 
2, Pricing Shortcomings 
To 9pproach the subject or shortcomings of the 
Ple.ns from enother viewpoint, we refer to the. quotations in 
this thesis on pages 59-62 from writings of Pigou, Mender-
ehausen, and Hirch. Rigid prices were felt to be undesir-
able. by all in that they generally curtail production aDd 
because there has been found no way of preventing some in• 
crease in prices regardless of ceilings and related fiscal 
and wage controls. It is probable that the Premium Price 
Ple.n would have been more effective in stimulating produc-
tion of copper if periodically the ceilings were increased 
moderately as justified by increased wage and supply coats .. 
and we know these were substantial from 1941-1947. This 
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would heve been most beneficial to the larger producers whose 
production we showed, on page 921 to have been increased moat 
substantially through 1943 but who benefitted slightly if any 
from premium prices. While it is true that labor shortages 
handicapped mines large and small, we cannot assume that this 
was the only factor affecting dwindling production. It is 
possible that their large units of production could have at• 
tracted to their well eatabliabed and efficient mining centers, 
sufficient manpower to bolster this sagging production were 
their operAtions sufficiently profitable to permit develop-
ment and exploration. 
In spite of record production, the report or net 
profits for the Big Three indicates 1n part the handicap ot 
the rigid ceiling price imposed. 
Net Income per Share 
ttnaconda :Kennecott Phelps Dodge 
1940 4,04 4o05 2,49 
1941 s.ol 4o55 2,80 
1942 4o20 4o26 2,77 
1943 3,89 3o90 2,78 
1944 :3.62 3.39 2.49 
1945 lo35 a.79 s.oo 
1946 2o75 2 .. 13 2.93 
1947 s.os 8,49 8,64 
source • Annual Report• 
It aeema a fair assumption that these profits eon. 
fiPm the thesis of the eoonom1sts mentioned previously rela-
tive to the etteot of rigid prioea end redDeed profits upon 
produotion. 
3, Political Shortcomi!la 
Price control being an act of the government, seta 
in motion forces distinctly political end not economic. The 
amount of apace we devoted 1n this thesis (pages 77-87) re-
flected some of the probleu, reported by government aouroea 1 
which the War Manpower Oomm1aaion and the Labor Division of 
the War Production Board ezperieneed politically in running 
the economic machine tor copper, Government pub1ioat1ona 
ahown in ~ Bibliography contain DUmeroua reterenoea and 
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exhibits of memoranda and correspondence clearly showing 
political pressures interfering with efficient operation of 
the quota system. These are too numerous to quote here. 
Hearinsa on billa to extend premium prices into 
peacetime years do not reveal a sreat deal of sound reaaoa. 
ing nor appreciation of economics on the part of the elected 
repraaantat1vee from the minins states. Although the War 
Production Board, the Federal Loan Agency, the Metals Re-
serve Company offioial8, and the State Depart~nt was opposed 
to extension of the Plan in 1945, Congressional and labor 
pressure pushed it through. This performance was repeated 
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in 1940 when the Plan was extended to JUly 1947 • When the 
President signed the stockpiling bill in July, 1946, he pro-
tested against the provision whloh interested marginal pro• 
ducers moat that, whenever possible purchases for the stock• 
pile would be made from domestic producers. This bill to ex-
tend the Premium Plan, provided, in extremely vague teru, 
that conservation payments should be made when market price 
did not justify the development of marginal domestic resour-
ces, and that the materials so produced should be stockpiled 
and only released in time of severe copper shortage or nation-
al emergency, 
The final attempts to continue subsidies Under the 
Plan in 1947 was vetoed by the President and his action was 
sustained. 
c, summarz 
In oonclus1on, we must admit that there are many 
reasons tor price control in a war economy. There may be 
some drawbacks 1n obtaining -.x1mum production but these 
seem to be offset by the anti-intlation&r7 benefits result-
ing. Since with price control there must be subsidies, the 
use of subsidies moat efficiently becomes the problem to be 
resolved. 
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The reasonable suooeas of this first attempt by 
the government in putting this aubsidy program into effeot 
must be admitted. Breakdowns and sbortoomings experienced 
were due partly to the theoretical approach which produced 
rigidity or ceiling price, partly to the administration or 
the Plan, and partly to the inevitable political pressures 
which unfortunately seemed to influence economic considera-
tions and actions adversely. In spite of these factors, the 
experience gained from these two Plana could and no doubt 
will form the basis for new and successful means of solving 
all these problema as they arise in the future. 
APPEIDIX 
Miscellaneous Tables 
Source - National Industrial Conference Board Inc. Copy. 
right. 1951 
12'7 
Mine produ~tion of recoverable copper in the United States. 1937 47. with production of maximum year, and cumulative production from 
earliest record to end of 1947, by States . in short tons 
:-t.IIC 
\\' o:.< l Nil ~tatr< m.t ,\I •~k.•: 
.\ l.1~k I .• • •••• 
.\rilHII,l 
C<~ltforni.• 
Cul<'mdu 
hhho . 
;\I Olll:ll\:1 • 
:-,:,.,-,,,1 . .. 
:-.;,.,, .\le\ko 
Ort·~Oll - - -- .. -----
,, •Ut h I lakota • . .• T,.,,,, 
\'tah .. _ • 
\\"a~hiucton • .. .. 
Wyomiug ____ __ _ 
Total. .. 
\\",.,:;t l'eutr:•l ~tnlt•:': 
:\I is.,ouri ____ ..... _. 
Stutt:>s t:':~st of the .\li:'~b~ippi· 
.\l:lhamn. ---------- ....... 
(it~lrgL\ ~- ---·- -_, _ .•• 
.\l ilill(' ------- --- -----
::\f 1\1') Lln•l . _ .. 
:\I !ISS:.I!'hli~Cl ts ........... .. 
::\lichil!:lfi -- - -------
Xt>W ll:lmp•hirc ......... .. 
X<•rth Carolina .... -------
I't•nnsylvani:l ---------- .. 
::'c•ut h C'aroliru .......... __ 
Tenne.,<l'e ........ -------. 
\:er~IO.nt •. _______ ... _____ _ 
\ 1!¥1111:1 ----- ----- --- -
Wlseonsiu -----------------~ 
TotaL ............ - ------ -
Orand total _____ -------
::\l :nimum p~n­
dttc·tluu · l'rodt:ctiuh by yo;ir< 
J'Utill pro-
<ith'li•lll 
lwrn e;lrll 
C't r ('Ct.Jrll 
Yc:1r 
l!nt; 
1\I~"J 
"~-~ · w:~-.. 
lfl<.l7 
191•\ 
I!Jl.! 
UH:.! 
Hilt; 
!Ill' 
1112-.. 
Hil3 
I!~ H\ 
ltlo.lU 
1\11,; 
I !107 
1\H 7 
I!HS 
l'lli' 
!Wt> 
1\ll ti 
l!~l'i 
1!130 
ltl4:! 
(J) 
1930 
lti4G 
l!IH 
1!114 
1943 
·---------------·----- ---- - ---------
t~uan­
trty 1!!37 1~13b 1!139 
HHu • w 17 1'0 ,.,, t llf 11'17 
I 
1!!40 I J!IH lfl4:! I ltl43 1\JH 1945 
--- :-----,----- ------ --.----- ---
. . ' 
bH. t~2; I 1 i, 33t_1 14. 5 1~1 j 12S I [.;. 7:! ~"2 :?; '.? I 5 :.? I 1'2 f•''"l. ,;~ 
'.t:>, Jt 4 
1 
~s~. 4~s 210. 7t•~ 1 !!6:!. 11:.! ~ 2~1,. l!l~ 1 3:.!~. ~~; 3!!3, 3-.7 403, ~ ~~ 3~~- ~~; z:;~. :!I!~ : .. >~~·- ~23 3t~!· :!I~ 11 .£:.~ t. :1,_111 2-..,t.l-t, .~.:!.>1 ~)f1 t.l~l (1,43-. ,l,.143 !,II.~S 1\,111-, I_,,_( h.4 •• 1 4. --lil -.-l•cl , to.s,_,J( 
14.1 71 I !O,\J31 14.171 1:1,215 12,11>! 11,7·b !,Ill:! I,O:!S 1.04~ 1,-t-..;, 1,7[>4 :.!,lb(.l ::5:.!,,~)1 
5, 1451 :!, :1:12 ::!, 11!1 :!, 51tl 3. 34!1 3, •i:.!l 3. 430 :!, :L!4 I, G.'li I. 51' I, m-.. I, 640 lll'.l, 4:!7 
I 7ti, ~'!:' IH .~:!S 7~, :!~3 !l~. ~:.!~ 1;;"i, 3~1 I:-.., O:l•i It_l, IL~ I 1~ 1,5~5 II. S, I :~1 ~'· ~~! [l'i, ~'~ 57, f!l-~1 1\,l>:l•i. ~~:! 
':l,t.t•l 7-t,t;(l3 4h,!h\l flh,,)\1, ,,,4,•-l ,,,till "l.lo!•3 d,Uh._ h!,:!,l2 .•.!,;,~1;> 4,,11111 4~1,tit,~l 1.~1:!,.!.! 
'll, lOti 3:!, 0.">:1 :.'0, 43!1 4!\, 14:! tl!l, .'4" 73, 47-.. !:".l, 100 ;t;, lti3 til!, i30 51i, 57! [,(), lVI tAl, :.~)5 I, -till, 4!H 
I, 7!11 410 JS 4S ~s l>J' 10:1 ti :1 I i 14 !:!, 3.~7 
3~ • .. .. • .. • .. • .. • .. .. .. ti . . .. I .. .. • • I . • • • • ll)(l 
' ?21 If,() !I) :ll 30 t) \4\J ... , 115 ' 
3!3.1.-..\1 :!115, H\11 10.;, !:!ti 171. S!l\1 :!:ll, .;ti4 :!•iii, -.:!~ 3()1\, li!ll 3:!3, t)-..!1 :!S!, [•i5 :!:!•i, 
tl, til '.! ,;4 G, 017 ~.\!tiS '\1, til! s. liS•\ S, 031l 7, 3l.i ti, Iti~l 5. ' 
~.Jfl'.? _J_ ...... ~- --~--- .................... ~ 4 .• .......... ..... .. ............ I 
___ =::- ;~2. o-n 5oo, -t~ 6iJ. u-.7 bHI, t~'i I S:Jti, 743 1. ois, s~ 11. uzs, Ifill \lit. 777 1 i.!ti. l-
3. 3!~ :!t>!l __ • • • r.,..; I 1. -tO: 1 1. 31)() 1. 34() 3. :l•J:? I 3. : . 
=I I . . -- ,='--==. i ~~ 4 1--· ------ ----------
.4h.. -- .... -- . 
;•, I 3 
.;17ti I 114. ~.;4 
~:! 1 4,5:!7 
I 
l~!l l 57'2.367 
l~·~l I. 1;,.)7 
-------- ---------' 
-------- ......... 
- ---·- ---- ----
43, !l'i.'; 4~. !9'i 
--- - ------· ---··-- -- ---- ----- ---------- ---------- ----------1----------'------ -- - ~---------,'- ---- -----(!) (6\ (6) (1) (6) (6) (t) (6) ,. (6) ' - - . -- ------ - -- ---------(!) (6) (I) (I) (6) (I) (t) (6) (I) (6) (1) (1) 
(1) 1 (I) ---------- F) (;) (l) (T) ,_ - .. - - -- ·--- ~· - I (I) 
(!) 112,:!!i IJ0,540 6]0,648 'l:.!,i3:! IJ3,56ti IJ4,li4 IJ3,S.~.'i I IJ:!.SliO II2.3'i5 IJ2,850 1]2,686 
p) ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------. ------- • 2HO I 1, <.tl'\ (6) (6) (1) 201 (:) 
1 
<'l ____ __ _ ________ _ __________ 2S 100 201 ;o __________ 5 
5 .......... I.... • .. .. . .. ...... , ....... " .. .. .. .. .. , ... _ • • , _ .. • ...... , . .. ...... , >....... .. . .. .. .. . .. (2) 
_- _-- .~9. t>st; 1 57. 21-l 1 5-t. r.33 1 s7. 043 1 tl(l, oor. 1 .~!l. ~st 61. no<~ .~7. 470 • 42. s."'' 1 34.513 1 31\. "'5 ~- 509 
t,UtiO,SIS I 841,\l!lS 1 557, io3 1 728,320 1 s;s,osn 1 9.5b,l4!l I,()."tl,OtH :I.o<JO.biS 1 !172,5411 1 i7t,S~4 1 t>o-.. 7371 Mi,563 l'33,b:!4,b2ti 
1 For ;\fissouri and States east or the :'.fississlppi, maximum since 1905. 
2 Small quantity for Wisconsin ineluded with Missouri. 
• Tenne~"<·e ineludrs other States indicated by footnote 6; Bureau of ::\linrs not atliht•rty 
to publish separate figures. 
J Datu not a\·ail:lhle. 
• The !90S ,·olume or ::\fineral Resl)urces eredits this fhrure to :'.lassachusctts and ::-\('w 
llnmpshire; the l!)ll!l volume credits it to '\ew Hampshire alone. 
I Bun•au or ;\lines not at li~rty to publish figure. 
I Less than I ton. 
' For Stall'S othrr than ::\lichi!!an, figurrs represent l:lr!!dY smdtcr output. Exeludl's 
small quantity, not ~l·parahle, lor Wisconsin shown with ::\!is~ouri. 
' Largl'iy srnt:>lter produ('tion lor St:ltt·~ rast of the ::\1 bsbsippi !'\Cl'Pt ~lichi~;m. 
~ 
C;l 
~ 
~ 
..... 
.... 
~ 
M 
~ 
> 
t" 
'(fl8 
-<> 
Mt:J:I 
>t-i 
!:l:l t:z:J 
ttl 
OH 0:>< ~ 
-~ 
... 
-l 
1929 
1933 
1936 
1937 
19)8 
1?39 
lJhO 
1?h1 
l?h2 
l?h3 
1?1111 
1?4'' 
1?~6 
l?h7 
}~;)~f3 
l ?'~? 
(J) 
v ~ rnHL:rn n o 
~©l?>l?>rn~ I?>~@IQ)lUJ~~~ lr~©IKA\ ~/KA\lE~V.D~ @~[g$ 
Source: Pureau of Mines 
Thousai'}Cis of Sht>rt Tons 
Mine Smelter Refinery 
1929 997.6 ·1,001.4 991.h 
1933 190.6 225.0 240.7 
1?36 614.5 611.4 645.5 
1937 842.0 834.7 822.3 
1938 557.8 562.3 552 .6 
1939 728.3 712.7 704.9 
1?40 878.1 909.1 927.2 
1941 958.1 966 .1 975.4 
1942 1,080.1 1,088 .0 1,064.8 
1943 1,090.8 1,092.9 1, 082.1 
1944 972.5 1,003.4 973.9 
1945 772.9 782.7 775.7 
1946 608.7 599.7 578.4 
1947 847.6 862.9 9Cf).2 
1948 834.8 842.5 860.0 
1949 752 .8 757.9 695.0 
l950p 907.0 901.0 92 7 .o 
p Prelimi nary 
tr£rn111.~ nu 
~r>~©[Q)M~'ii'll©~ ©~P ~~ir~!Nl~[Q) ~©~r>~r>rn~, 
rn1~ I?~D~ & ~~ ~~rro~~~$ c1 ) 
Suurce : American PUr~'GU O! F•· L:tl :JL--~ t.; :-; ~ ~cs 
Short- Tons 
Scconrlary 
From From 
Prir.~ary Secondary Scconriary 
or ?.lister Blister From Other 
Vi rein Produced Recei vnrl Scra p Total 
1, 3711, 112 47, 628 3' :;:;!~ llh, YlJ, l.(J6 , 126 
315 , 317 25' 2fl4 11 , 760 .:rl , 390 fHl , ll))j 
803 , o~h 66, 042 6, 3011 ';e, ··r.r) 130, ?12 
1, 080, 467 90, 087 1, h6? ()}j , ?~fl 1)6, r;~)l 
813 , 832 47, 222 1, 311'( )11, '{]2 ?0, 281 
970, 559 61! , 21~ 2 , 2' 6 l,? , r;w 116, 039 
1, 267 , 823 66, 932 2 , ??8 ', r, , O)jO 1?~ , 270 
1, 377, on r;o, n1 Ttfl J,r; ' [\),0 ?'1 , 389 
1, 41? , )~?8 )1.~ , 3111 1, ,-~~ ?'( ' lll 83 ' 0)1 
l , h01, 117 fl7 , 67') 1, Jhh JO, 'F!~ 11?, 932 
1 , 2''c ,hn w ,1n Jhfl I , 0)!1 ?11, :;r,r, 
1, 0?'' ' (!)I? )jJ ,'(' '' I (,'( }I(,')(') fl'; , 23S 
8f'? , ., l 2'(, )')( 1 '(J J,rJ, ~~n ()8 , 5?!1 
1, }''r', '(11? F;J,,: )() l'('f , f)('; ?(>] , 90~ 
1 , ( '.1} I , Jf,}j 'J'J J 1?(, •:,~ll'( l (,1 ' J,l ( 2f/; , ?DO 
:,JVJ, '/r 1 '('' J JP,)j El ,'(? 3 Jr;l,}j)j ?35 , r:il1o 
Grand 
Total 
1, 542 , 238 
h03 , 751 
933 , 976 
1, 237 , 021 
?o4, 1D 
1, 086, 5?8 
1, 3?3 , 093 
1, 1,75, 070 
1, ';02 , 51.19 
1 ' ''21, 049 
1, Jhn, 983 
1, 1130, ?81! 
?':2 , 037 
1, hJ7 J 647 
1, )60, 264 
1, 166, 461 
~"' • 
1 
"I~ !'11:; ,• r )T" 1~3)-l/h~ i nr:Jwlr! t)'(.:1 L l ,,,, Loll 'y prirn-1ry r'ef',irr\o:r'ir R 
tr~oo!Lrn ~~ 
lVlo ~0 «:©!Nl~M/k'A\!PtrO©!Nl ©lf ~rnlfo~rn!W ~©[¥)[¥)rn~ 
~~ ~ rn[¥)@~trrn [9) oo~ 1r !Hl~rn rn ~@lUJ~~rn~ 
Thousands of Short Tons 
United States American 
Bureau of Bureau of Copper 
11ines (l) Association(2) Metal_Statistics(3) 
1929 889 n.a. 1,119 
1933 339 n.a. 382 
1936 656 721 809 
1937 695 785 878 
1938 .407 527 522 
1939 715 793 845 
1940 1,009 960 1,100 
1941 1,642 1,578 1,684 
1942 1,608 1,518 1,775 
'1943 1,502 1,702 1,"790 
1944 1,504 1,656 1,694 
1945 1,415 1,462 1,454 
. 
1946 1,391 1,231 1,26la 
1947 1,286 1,338 l,384b 
1948 1,214c 1,394 1,.344b 
1949 l,072c 1,053 1, 032b 
1950p 1,475c 1,438 1,37lb 
(1) Apparent co.nsumption of new refined copper. Fig-
ures from 1942-1949 are adjusted for Office of 
Metals Reserve stock changes. O.f'1.R. stocks con-
signed to National Stockpile late in 1948 
(2) Includes duty-free refined copper through March 
31, 1947 and thereafter, all refined copper in the 
United States, regardless of origin 
(3) Figures for 1929-1938 include deliveries from pri-
mary refineries in North and South America to the 
United States . Beginning 1939, shipments from 
Canada are omitted . Firures for 1929-1945 are de-
liveries to customers in the United States and in-
clude copper resulting from secondary, both as cus-
tom intake and treated on toll. They nlso include 
shipments which were placed in storage either for 
account of the industry or the United States gov-
ernment . Figures for 1946-1950 are as reported by 
the Copper Institute and include copper resulting 
from secondary intake but not secon~~ry mJterial 
treated on toll 
a Includes duty-free copper only 
b Includes all copper regardless of orir,in 
c Includes copper delivered by industry to the Na-
tional Stockpile 
p Preliminary 
n.a. Not avnilable 
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